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Empiricizing the Equal Protection Approach to Abortion
Calvin TerBeek*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of legal scholarship on abortion is "stultified,"' consisting largely of an
academic parlor game that, while perhaps enjoyable for the participants, fails to
advance the debate. Prominent conservative scholar Michael Stokes Paulsen tells
his readers in the pages of the Yale Law Journal that at a symposium he called
Akhil Reed Amar (who is apparently his friend) a "coward and a collaborator"
for his views on Roe v. Wade,2 while lambasting other well-known scholars as
"persons of violence" for their pro-choice views.' On the other side of academia's
political fence, Yale law professor Jack Balkin, in Abortion and Original
Meaning, argues that abortion can be defended on originalist grounds.4 While this
is, in the least, a thought-provoking piece of scholarship, others have already
taken Balkin to task for (what they deem to be) his unsophisticated definition of
originalism.' One scholar points out that Balkin's approach may confuse some
into thinking that he is still a living constitutionalist wolf in originalist sheep's
• 6
clothing. Another recent salvo by conservative scholars John 0. McGinnis and
* Law Clerk for the Honorable Andrew W. Austin for the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. J.D., Tulane Law School (2005); B.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
(2001).
1. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 337 (2005) [hereinafter
Friedman, Judicial Review] (discussing how the "central debates" of normative constitutional scholarship have
grown stale).
2. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J.
2037, 2040 n.2 (2006).
3. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 196, 213
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion].
4. Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 119, 2006), http://ssm.comabstract=925558 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. Mitchell Berman, Originalsim and its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion) 2 (U.
Tex. Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 117, Jan. 16, 2007), http://ssm.com/abstract=957630 (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Randy Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=954601 (manuscript at 10, on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Ethan J.
Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT n.4 (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952384 (manuscript at 1, on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(detailing academics who propound "lefty originalism.").
Let me be clear on this point, Abortion and Original Meaning is an important piece of scholarship and
moves the debate forward. Moreover, the prolific Balkin, as this paper was in its final stages, released two more
papers on abortion. The first urges that the right to abortion, given the challenges of the future (i.e., genetic
engineering, etc.), should be lodged in the Equal Protection Clause. Jack M. Balkin, How Genetic Technologies
will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843-44 (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.
com/abstract=964508 [hereinafter Balkin, Genetic Technologies] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
While this is a typically interesting paper from Balkin, his follow-up paper to Abortion and Original Meaning
entitled Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption (a response to critiques of Abortion and Original
Meaning) will, I predict, fundamentally change the originalism debate in the legal academy. See Jack Balkin,
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Nelson Lund-in an argument that conservative scholars have been advancing
for years-is that Roe epitomizes "an unrepresentative and unaccountable group
of Justices ... fabricating the rights that are pleasing to them.
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The scholarly skirmish over abortion, it sometimes seems, threatens to
become academia's equivalent of Harold Spaeth's and Jeffrey Segal's
"attitudinal model,"' a battle of competing jurisprudential theories informed by
priors based on "ideology, temperament, and one's general bent in constitutional
[scholarship]." 9 As the Court's composition changes, so do the normative
theories about what the Court should "do,"' leaving one to wonder whether most
constitutional scholarship is simply political in nature." Judge Richard Posner
Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.comsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=987060#PaperDownload [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional
Redemption] (manuscript at 2-3, on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Balkin is also the editor of a recent compilation of mock opinions in which a collection of some of the
country's best law professors were asked to participate in a vicarious Roe v. Wade Court and write an opinion
on the case. See WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). David Garrow, reviewing
the book, felt that many of the mock opinions evince "a highly embarrassing failure to perform." David Garrow,
Roe v. Wade Revisited, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 71, 71 (2005) (book review). Not all were failures, Garrow generously
recognized. Id. at 72-74. Balkin's "majority" opinion is singled out for praise. Id. at 72. Mark Tushnet's mock
opinion, which is essentially Justice Douglas's opinion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), is
characteristically clever, according to Garrow. See id. at 74-75. Tushnet argued that the exercise was inherently
flawed, "that it may be impossible, and certainly is unfair ... to think ourselves back into the position of the
judges who decided Roe," and implicitly criticized those shadow justices who attempted to use an Equal
Protection clause rubric because such a theory "would have been regarded in 1973 as outside the bounds of
professional responsibility." Mark Tushnet, Comments from the Contributors, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID, supra, at 250-52.
7. Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MIcH. L. REV. 1555,
1610 (2004).
8. JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL 86 (1993)
(famously stating that "Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted
the way he did because he was extremely liberal"). See JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 316-19 (2002) [SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL] (updating their analysis of a decade earlier and noting that their model correctly predicted, for example,
seventy-seven percent of the justices' votes in Fourth Amendment cases analyzed); see also Jeffrey A. Segal &
Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
557, 561 (1989) (arguing that eighty percent of justices votes in civil liberties and civil rights cases spanning
almost four decades could be explained by policy preference).
9. RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 76 (2003) [hereinafter POSNER,
PRAGMATISM]. The quote reads "bent in constitutional adjudication," as Posner was talking about judges in the
passage quoted. But there is no reason to believe that the same problems do not arise in legal scholarship, in
many ways a parallel profession to the judiciary. Id.
10. See Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149-51
(2004); see also Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial
Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2004) ("A positive approach is more concerned with trying to
understand what the Supreme Court does do, and why it does it. It is that descriptive, explanatory lens that
grants some small measure of remove from a subject about which there are typically strong feelings.").
11. Cf Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1062 (2001). I still remember my youthful shock, and no slight embarrassment, when a political science
professor of mine in college told me that "JDs aren't that respected by PhDs." Seeing my surprise, he tried to
backtrack, but the damage was done, and I slunk off to law school with my intellectual tail between my legs.
Not incidentally, today he's a leading (normative) scholar of political theory and international relations at
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argues that "constitutional theory has no power to command agreement from
people not already predisposed to accept the theorist's policy prescriptions."'
2
Normative constitutional scholarship-what many times essentially amounts to
advocacy briefs to the Supreme Court'--on the abortion issue continues to be
churned out,'4 but it "fails to come to grips with the lessons of [the] positive
scholarship" of political and social scientists. 5 These "grand theor[ists]"'' 6 include
next to nothing in their scholarship about what abortion looks like in reality, that
is, what the "known facts" are about the practice.'7
In an insightful paper, Barry Friedman shows how normative constitutional
scholarship, that is to say most constitutional scholarship, "will remain
impoverished until it fully embraces the positive project."'" More pointedly,
prominent political scientist Mark Graber writes that "many [abortion] polemics
do little more than reassure their small targeted audiences that only a moral cretin
Northwestern University.
More seriously, it needs to be pointed out that although Balkin and Levinson are speaking in terms of
judges writing opinions that conform to their preferred policies and ideologies, the phrase fits equally well with
most constitutional scholarship as much of it is devoted to being a shadow Supreme Court justice. RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 157-58 (1999) [hereinafter POSNER,
PROBLEMATICS].
12. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
13. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981) ("One [strategy] is simply to acknowledge that
most of our writings are not political theory but advocacy scholarship--amicus briefs ultimately designed to
persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good."); see also Scott D. Gerber, Privacy and
Constitutional Theory, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 165, 184 (2000) (arguing that all the dominant approaches to
constitutional theory could be shown to both support and undercut a constitutional right to privacy).
14. See, e.g., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6 (asking law professors to write an
"opinion" in the Roe v. Wade case using only those materials that would have been available to the justices in
1973); Lund & McGinnis, supra note 7; Michael McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, The Right to Die] (arguing that Glucksberg's
heuristic has replaced Roe's as the correct approach to substantive due process questions); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003) [hereinafter
Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision] (arguing that Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, not Roe v.
Wade, bears the title's distinction).
15. Friedman, supra note 1, at 259 (arguing that legal scholars must begin to take into account the
lessons of positive political science scholarship).
16. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
(1988) [hereinafter TUSHNET, CRITICAL ANALYSIS]. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry also point out that grand
constitutionalist theorists on the left and the right who attempt to ground constitutional law "objectively" may
have good intentions, but the enterprise is doomed to fail given the inevitable smuggling in of the theorist's
priors. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 140-68 (Univ. Chi. Press 2002).
17. Mark Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Neglected
Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQ. 309, 325 (2002) [hereinafter Graber, Constitutional Politics]; see also MARK
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996)
[hereinafter GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION]; RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) [hereinafter
POSNER, SEX AND REASON].
18. Friedman, supra note 1, at 259.
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or constitutional moron could doubt the unassailable justice of the author's
position on reproductive policy."' 9
The arguments for and against abortion by normative constitutional theorists
have failed to produce any real level of agreement. Instead of "inhaling the
intoxicating vapors of constitutional theory,"'2 scholars need to think about what
the world might look like without a right to abortion or, conversely, with
completely unfettered access to "abortion on demand." 2 The thesis of this paper
is that the strongest justification for keeping the basic premise of Roe intact is
supplementing the normative argument finding the abortion right in the equal
protection clause with the positive scholarship on abortion because that
scholarship re-enforces the equal protection approach while at the same time
undercutting arguments attacking the promise of Roe.22
19. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 37. Jack Balkin puts it this way: "I do not think
that one can usefully engage in normative constitutional theory without at least paying some attention to what
positive constitutional theory teaches us." Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 89.
20. POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 9, at 79-80.
21. See Clark D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion
Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 125 (2005).
22. And for that matter, scholars who are opposed to Roe should confront the positive scholarship on
abortion rather than-as we will see-make arguments that do not deal with the facts on the ground.
This is as good a time as any to note that the only other paper by a legal scholar that I am aware of that
systematically utilizes medical and social science research in order to help construct their argument (there is
political scientist Mark Graber's excellent book, Rethinking Abortion) is Clarke D. Forsythe's and Stephen B.
Presser's The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. R. L. &
POL. 85 (2005) [hereinafter Forsythe & Presser, Tragic Failure]. There they argue that the social and medical
science evidence shows that abortion is an abject failure and a threat to women's health. Id. at 89-90. Their
paper must be taken with a very large grain of salt. First, it is clear that both authors, especially Forsythe, are
serious partisans on the abortion issue. Forsythe works for a non-profit organization, Americans United for Life,
whose goal is to overtum Roe. See Clark D. Forsythe, The Cultural Yearning for Human Dignity,
http://www.unitedforlife.org/our-philosophy.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); see also Reva Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1023 [hereinafter Siegel, New Politics] (noting that Forsythe's
organization "coordinates the national legislative strategy designed to chip away at Roe"). Presser is a well-
known conservative academic that praises Justice Thomas's inclination to overrule any precedent that does not
"get it right." See Stephen B. Presser, Touting Thomas, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan/Feb 2005, http://www.legalaffairs.
org/issues/January-February-2005/review-presser-janfeb05.msp (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
More importantly, there are problems with the substance of their argument. For example, one of their
arguments is that legalized abortion has given males increased power in the marriage and sex market because
females who do not engage in pre-marital sex are at a distinct disadvantage to those who will. Forsythe &
Presser, supra note 21, at 124-25. For support, they cite to conservative academic John Lott-of More Guns,
Less Crime fame, whose work on the gun control issue has been in the middle of an academic firestorm with
serious charges of academic fraud leveled against him, see Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Research Fraud and
Public Policy, SCIENCE, Apr. 18, 2003, at 393-who in turn cites George Akerloff's paper propounding this
thesis. George A. Akerloff et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, Ill Q. J.
ECON. 277 (1996). While Akerloff's thesis is surely interesting, it is important to note that Akerloff's thesis is
simply based on economic models and there has been no "substantive empirical testing that could validate
them." PHILLIP B. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES 161-64, 189-90 (2004) [hereinafter LEVINE, SEX AND
CONSEQUENCES]. Nor do the authors mention that there are other economic models that come to an opposite
conclusion. See id. at 162 (discussing Thomas Kane & Douglas Staiger, Teen Motherhood and Abortion Access,
111 Q. J. ECON. 467 (1996)).
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This justification is especially important given the current legal climate
surrounding abortion. The South Dakota legislature recently passed a law-later
rejected by voters in a referendum-that restricted abortion in all cases unless the
mother's life was in danger.23 One scholar has noted that much of the basis for the
South Dakota legislation, to say nothing of the overall strategy of the pro-life
movement whose central talking-point today, having turned subordinated fetal-
life arguments, is that abortion is harmful to women. This contention is
buttressed with debatable empirical evidence and questionable readings of the
24
existing literature. The recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart is a
disconcerting reminder that politicized arguments have gained significant traction
where it matters a great deal, the Supreme Court.26
Before moving to the empirical analysis, I will sketch out the dominant
normative approaches to abortion, both liberal and conservative. I then synthesize
the empirical literature on abortion. It is my hope that the heuristic I advance in
Moreover, and related to this point, the authors maintain that because of this putative "fact" (that
unmarried men benefit from legalized abortion) it is no wonder "men favor legalized abortion more than
women." Forsythe & Presser, supra note 21, at 124. It is evident that Forsythe and Presser selected only those
findings that support their position. A careful analysis of the social science evidence shows inconsistent results,
insofar as gender differences are concerned, in support of abortion. Jennifer Strickler & Nicholas Douglas,
Changing Frameworks in Attitudes Toward Abortion, 17 Soc. F. 187, 189 (2002) (citing conflicting studies).
One more example should suffice to cement the point: Forsythe and Presser continually trumpet as fact
that women's mental health is severely damaged by abortion to the point that they have a dramatically increased
risk of suicide. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 21, at 112, 122. However, the study they cite shows that only
Finnish women who have abortions have a higher suicide rate than those who give birth. Mika Gissler et al.,
Suicides after Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-1994: Register Linkage Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431 (1996)
[hereinafter Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy]. This epitomizes the old saw that "anything can be proven
by statistics." Economist Jonathan Klick has shown that "such a finding could very well be the result of self-
selection bias. That is, it could be the case that women who chose to abort their pregnancies tend to be those
who are predisposed to depression, implying that the link between abortion and suicide is coincidental as
opposed to causal." Jonathan Klick, Mandatory Waiting Periods for Abortions and Female Mental Health, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 183, 187 (2006) [hereinafter Klick, Mandatory Waiting Periods]. In any event, the empirical
evidence actually undermines Forsythe's and Presser's argument. See infra notes 218, 219 and accompanying
text. In another example of selective citation and questionable analysis, Forsythe and Presser argue that the
"divorce rate was twice the rate in 1960" and that, therefore, abortion must be to blame. Forsythe & Presser,
supra note 21, at 128. One would be hard-pressed to find a social scientist that would juxtapose these statistics
and claim causation. However, since Forsythe and Presser are engaged in a partisan project, these pieces of
information, surely relevant to objectively assessing their argument, are left on the cutting room floor. What is
more, given that Forsythe and Presser amass what they believe to be objective data showing that abortion is a
scourge upon the female gender, one must raise an eye-brow that their solution is to return the abortion issue to
the states. Id. at 93. If they truly believe abortion is as bad as they would like the reader to think, they should
advocate for the abolition of abortion.
23. Siegel, New Politics, supra note 22, at 991-94 (discussing South Dakota legislation).
24. Id. at 1000-29.
25. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
26. In Gonzales, Justice Kennedy, in what has already become an oft-quoted passage, wrote: "While we
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained." Id. at 1634. To support this
proposition, Kennedy cited to a brief filed by a pro-life advocacy group complied and in the next sentence (also
citing to this same amici brief) opined that "[s]evere depression and loss of self-esteem can follow [an
abortion]." Id. The empirical evidence proves both of these points not only unexceptionable, but unsupported.
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the final section will serve to reinforce the foundation for the inevitable normat-
ive argument that must be made about abortion.
II. ABORTION AND SCHOLARSHIP
Substantive due process is the legal theory which presently underpins the
abortion right in the Supreme Court Reporters. There are different strands of this
theory.27 There is the historical or tradition based theory-Washington v.
Glucksberg is a good example 2-which holds that the Court will find a "new," or
unenumerated right, only when that right is "objectively, deeply rooted in the
Nation's history and tradition."2 9 There is also what Judge Michael McConnell
calls the "moral-philosophic" approach 3 -think Dworkin's Hercules 3-
exemplified by the Griswold-Roe-Casey (and now Lawrence) line of cases, the
so-called "sexual autonomy" cases." Most conservatives tend towards the
former,33 while many liberals prefer the latter.
3 4
A. Synthesizing Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court's reasoning in the sexual autonomy cases line of cases
can be synthesized as follows: it starts with the well-known Taft Court cases
invalidating Oregon35 and Nebraska 6 regulations. These cases give the argument
27. Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 66-68 (2006)
(discussing three distinct theories the Court has used in answering the question of how to approach
unenumerated rights, namely "historical tradition," "reasoned judgment," and "evolving national values"); Lund
& McGinnis, supra note 7, at 1541 (discussing the Griswold-Roe line of sexual autonomy cases as a subset of
the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive
Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 836-40 (2003)
(discussing the "fundamental liberty interest" or "unenumerated rights" branch of substantive due process).
28. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). The Court, in elucidating the contours of
the substantive due process inquiry, states "[o]ur established method of substantive-due-process analysis... [is
that] the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' Id. (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)).
31. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977).
32. See Conkle, supra note 27, at 98-106.
33. See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 7, at 1607-09; McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 14,
at 665-66.
34. Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (2094) ("Whatever its
shortcomings, for lesbians and gay men, Lawrence is a breakthrough."); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:
The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895, 1899 (2004) (stating
that "Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America" and rejoicing that
it is a "pathmarking decision" that "significantly alter[s] the historical trajectory of substantive due process and
thus of liberty").
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the
teaching of languages other than English in schools).
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a chronological dynamic by recalling a long history of citizen's private lives
being protected by unenumerated rights, untouchable by government.37 Also, it
may be noted that the Due Process Clause has its origins in the Magna Carta."
There will generally be a quote from Meyer, often that due process does not
simply guarantee procedure but the substantive rights "to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of [one's] own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."3 9 Skinner v.
Oklahoma40 offers Justice Douglas's famous admonition:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race .... Any experiment which the State
conducts is to [the individual's] irreparable injury. He is forever deprived
of a basic liberty.'
Next, the argument may draw some relevant quotes from Justice Harlan's
eloquent dissent in Poe v. Ullman,42  substantive due process opinion
extraordinaire.43 There are many worthwhile passages, for example: the statute
36. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding unconstitutional an Oregon law requiring
public school attendance).
37. In the American constitutional tradition, one can reach back as far as Justice Chase's and Justice
Iredell's "debate" in dueling opinions in Calder v. Bull and see that substantive due process was a colorable
argument in a judicial opinion as far back the eighteenth century. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386
(1798). Chief Justice John Marshall, in Fletcher v. Peck, held that whether one looked to the "particular
provisions of the constitution" or the "general principles which are common to our free institutions" the Georgia
state legislature had exceeded its powers. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810). One can also
reference, as conservatives often do, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford as early example
imbuing the Due Process Clause-of the Fifth Amendment-with substantive protections. See Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). This, however, does not automatically impugn, as conservatives would
have it, substantive due process. As Mark Tushnet has argued, it is at least understandable that "well-socialized
lawyers" in the South in 1855 took the position that they did in Dred Scott. See Mark Tushnet, Self-Historicism,
38 TULSA L. REV. 771, 773-75 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, Self-Historicism] (arguing that the historical era "a
well-socialized lawyer" finds himself in will determine what makes certain legal arguments plausible or not).
Indeed, simply criticizing them with today's moral outlook is a historical "cheapshot." Id. at 773. For an
argument in favor of removing the "bad cases" out of the constitutional canon, see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998) (calling for a reassessment of the
current canon).
38. Scholars note that protection from "substantively arbitrary government actions goes back a long
way, indeed to the Clause's origins in the Magna Carta." Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch Unenumerated Rights
Drift?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 209, 212 (2006) [hereinafter Tushnet, Unenumerated Rights]. See also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
39. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
40. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma law that required sterilization
of criminals who had been convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude).
41. Id. at 541.
42. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). This was, of course, the predecessor case to Griswold; that is, the Court had
before the very same statute at issue in Griswold, but ducked the issue because the case was not "ripe." Id.
43. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Constitution in American Civil Religion, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 123,
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prohibiting contraceptive use was an "unjustifiable invasion of privacy," 4 the
Constitution should be interpreted "not in a literalistic way ... but as the basic
charter of our society, 45 and the Due Process Clause means more than
"procedural fairness" and includes more than just those "restraints which had
prior to the [Fourteenth] Amendment been applicable merely to federal action." 4
There are also these oft-quoted passages:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty
of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society.
And:
It is this outlook which has led the Court continuingly to perceive
distinctions in the imperative character of Constitutional provisions,
since that character must be discerned from a particular provision's
larger context. And inasmuch as this context is one not of words, but of
history and purposes, the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty'
is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and
bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so
on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints, and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.8
The typical case then moves to Griswold. The argument may or may not
avoid Justice Douglas's cringe-inducing4 9 penumbral formulation; 0 however,
135 (1979) (calling Justice Harlan's opinion "one of the great opinions in American judicial history"). It is, no
doubt, the best defense of substantive due process in the Court's history.
44. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 540.
46. Id. at 540-41.
47. Id. at 542.
48. Id. at 542-43 (internal citations omitted).
49. At least, this is the received wisdom. However, Mark Tushnet makes an interesting argument that
Justice Douglas's penumbral formulation was "hardly incoherent" and that the argument contained at least the
germ of a fairly sophisticated textualist argument. Mark Tushnet, Two Notes on the Jurisprudence of Privacy, 8
CONST. COMM. 75, 79-80 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, Jurisprudence of Privacy].
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Griswold's citability lies in its recognition of an overarching right of privacy.5
The Court then might turn to Eisenstadt.12 Is there any doubt Justice Brennan
knew exactly what he was doing when he wrote:51 "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 54 This key language can
easily be stretched to cover a substantive due process right to abortion (although
Eisenstadt was an equal protection case).55
Roe, next in the precedential line, was of course defanged a bit by Casey, but
it is still good law (for now), although Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
contains lackluster prose and substantive arguments, thus making it short on
quotability. Finally, the substantive due process exegesis may conclude with a
some of Justice Kennedy's "distinctive" 57 prose from his opinions in the sexual
autonomy cases: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life";58
"[freedom extends beyond spatial bounds" and involves "more transcendent
dimensions, 59 or liberty "presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."6
50. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65 (2003) (citing Griswold for the larger pro-
position and staying away from the penumbral formulation); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 847-48 (1992) (same).
51. It also stands for what is by now the overwhelmingly accepted proposition that government cannot
forbid married couples from obtaining contraceptive information or devices. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 479 (1965). For an interesting discussion of how Griswold's reading of Meyer and Pierce can be called
"tortured", and at the same time be read as "identify[ing] the true privacy principle of Meyer and Pierce," see
TUSHNET, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 49-50.
52. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
53. See DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE
V. WADE 542 (1998) [hereinafter GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY] (discussing how the various justices law
clerks realized that Justice Brennan was attempting to constitutionalize abortion in Eisenstadt). Mark Tushnet,
who clerked for Justice Marshall, tells the story of how Justice Brennan would ask his clerks to name the most
important rule in constitutional law, and after listening to stammer around for a suitable answer, he would raise
up his hand with each of the five fingers spread, and say this "is the most important rule in constitutional law."
MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 35 (2005) [hereinafter TUSHNET, COURT DIVIDED].
54. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
55. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859 ("If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear or beget a
child had not been recognized in Roe .... ).
56. See id. at 874 (disposing of strict scrutiny review and utilizing the more lenient undue burden
approach).
57. See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 21 (noting Justice
Kennedy's tendencies towards "lucubrations").
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. Although this is from the O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy joint opinion, this
passage is generally attributed to Kennedy. See Dale Carpenter, Symposium: Gay Rights after Lawrence v.
Texas, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1140, 1149 n. 52 (2004) (citing Jeffrey Rosen's New Yorker
article--entitled "The Agonizer"-about Justice Kennedy).
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
60. Id.
2007 / Empiricizing the Equal Protection Approach to Abortion
B. The Right's Reaction
Most conservatives find this line of cases deeply unsatisfactory. Michael
Paulsen's Dissenting Opinion in What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said castigates
his fellow "justices" for defending Roe, a decision he evidently regards as
constitutional sewage.6' Paulsen believes that because abortion kills human fetus
or embryo, it takes a human life. 62 He further explains that the right to an abortion
does not appear in the text of the Constitution, nor can it plausibly be tied to the
document's text, history, structure, or "internal logic;" therefore, using the
precepts of constitutional Protestantism, 6 he encourages readers to engage in
civil disobedience and ignore the decision. 64
Quickly dispatching with the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as textual bases for a right to
abortion,65 Paulsen next attacks the utilization of the Due Process Clause as the
proper home for the right to abortion.66 He then makes the well-worn argument
that due process only affords a person process, and that the clause is not imbued
with a substantive guarantee of rights.67 After comparing Roe to Dred Scott, he
denigrates Griswold for the "obscurity of its reasoning" and labels Eisenstadt a
deceitful opinion.6' But, according to Paulsen, neither of those cases control the
determination of the right to abortion. These cases were wrongly decided, and
"the Court" need not countenance them.69 Given this, Paulsen concludes that
substantive due process cannot be advanced as the basis for the right to
abortion.70 He finishes his opinion by naming his "brethren"-as noted in the
Introduction-one by one as "persons of violence.'
61. Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 3, at 196-218.
62. Id. at 196.
63. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 19 (1988) (discussing constitutional
Protestantism, the notion that the Supreme Court does not have a stranglehold on the proper interpretation of the
Constitution).
64. Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 3, at 196-97.
65. Paulsen argues that "the public meaning" of the clause "at the time it was adopted" cannot mean that
the judiciary could fill up the clause with "whatever" it deemed to be a privilege or immunity of citizenship, and
that there is no historical evidence to back up such wrong-headed claims. Id. at 200. Paulsen seems to be
mistaken. As Akhil Reed Amar has shown in his book, The Bill of Rights, the Privileges or Immunities Clause
could be a source of unenumerated rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 120-23, 180 (1999). Noted
conservative scholar and jurist Judge Michael McConnell agrees, insofar as the unenumerated rights recognized
are "based not on the normative judgments of courts, but on constitutional text supplemented by the tradition
and experience of the nation." McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 14, at 666.
66. Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 3, at 202-03.
67. Id. at 203.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 203-04.
70. Id. at 204.
71. Id. at 213 ("Jack Balkin is a man of violence, Anita Allen is a woman of violence.").
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John 0. McGinnis and Nelson Lund have called the sexual liberty line of
cases "an insuperable obstacle to any lasting restraint on substantive due
process., 73 They call for the precedential heads of Griswold and Roe and
74
champion Glucksberg's test for substantive due process, where the Constitution
only protects those fundamental rights that are "objectively, deeply rooted in
this... Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" because such indicia
"provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decision-making. 75 Griswold,
they contend, is a "bizarre and facetious construction[] of the constitutional text,"
while Roe twists the evidence to conjure a deeply rooted right that never
existed.76 To McGinnis and Lund, it is important that Roe is still the subject of
internecine political warfare, which signals a lack of "overwhelming support"
required of a substantive due process right under Glucksberg.77 The sexual-liberty
line of cases does not have a unifying thread, they argue, and therefore the Court
can never apply them in a principled manner.7 ' The current state of the doctrine
"collapse[s] constitutional law into a matter of mere political preference,
undermining the judicial function. 79
Justice Scalia offers somewhat similar thoughts in his biting dissent inCasey.s° Arguing that the abortion is not a right protected by the Constitution, he
makes the textual argument that the Constitution does not mention the right of
abortion, nor is it a right that has traditionally been protected.8' In his estimation,
Roe helped create "the deeply divisive issue of abortion.., by elevating it to the
national level."82 He also notes that both Roe and Dred Scott rest "upon the
concept of 'substantive due process.' 8 3 However, Scalia goes further, repeatedly
castigating the Court's majority for basing its decision on "value judgments"
'4
and implicitly encouraging continued demonstrations and protests by those in the
pro-life movement because they are simply voicing their own value judgments,
which differ from the Court's. The most telling sentence in Scalia's bitter
72. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965).
73. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 7, at 1573.
74. Id. at 1607-12. Conservatives were ecstatic when Glucksberg came down; Judge Michael McConnell
wrote an article emphatically stating that "the constitutional methodology under which Roe was decided has
been repudiated." McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 14, at 666. Of course, he was mistaken.
75. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
76. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 7, at 1610.
77. Id. at 1598-99, 1608, 1610.
78. Id. at 1611.
79. id. at 1608.
80. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980, 999-1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 980.
82. Id. at 995. For more on this point, see David Garrow's seminal history of Roe v. Wade. GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 53, at 482-84, 546-47,576-77.
83. Casey, 505 U.S. at 998.
84. Id. at 983,999-1001.
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dissent8l states his belief that the majority merely "rattle[s] off a collection of
adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political
choice.8 6
C. The Wandering Jew of Constitutional Scholarship81
There is no doubt that Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe, where it mattered
most, was woefully inadequate. Justice Blackmun (in)famously wrote:
This right of privacy, whether it be found in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
88pregnancy.
85. See TUSHNET, COURT DIVIDED, supra note 53, at 204-22.
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 983.
87. Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The Question of
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 441 (1992) [hereinafter Posner, Legal
Reasoning]. Posner describes Roe as "the Wandering Jew of constitutional law," but the more accurate
characterization is mine because insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the abortion right has never left the
confines of the due process clause.
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). While the right is still found within the "liberty" interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was scaled back from "fundamental
right" status by the plurality opinion in Casey to an "undue burden" standard. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; see also
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000). It is worth noting how much of the mainstream media and
political punditry belabor under the misconception that Justice Douglas's penumbra and emanation heuristic
serves as the basis for the right to abortion. See, e.g., RAMESH PONNURU, THE PARTY OF DEATH 2 (2006)
(recent pro-life polemic by National Review senior editor stating that "[tihe Supreme Court ruled in 1973 that
,emanations and penumbras' from the Constitution protected a right to abortion."); Bruce Fein, Overrule in
Part, Affirm in Part, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A18 ("The court should declare that Roe was wretchedly
reasoned and wrongly decided. Its right to privacy rationale pivoting on penumbras, emanations, mysteries of
the universe, and the meaning of existence should be renounced."); Premium Pressure, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29,
2006, at 71 ("There is a lively debate in America as to whether the 'penumbras' and 'emanations' of the
Constitution include the right to abortion."). Even Justice Thomas, who I must assume is just reveling in a
constitutional law "joke," has a sign in his office that says, "Please do not emanate into the penumbra." See
Justice Clarence Thomas, Address at Ashland University's Fifteenth Annual Ashbrook Memorial Dinner (Feb.
5, 1999), http://www.ashbrook.org/events/memdin/thomas/speech.html (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
While Justice Blackmun's opinion does mention "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy," and does cite Justice Douglas's penumbral formulation in Griswold, the Court stated
that it believed that the right of abortion is found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe,
410 U.S. at 152-53; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); therefore, it clearly disavows
Justice Douglas's formulation, and no justice has ever advocated a return to that formulation. See POSNER, SEX
AND REASON, supra note 17, at 336 (the Roe Court did not try to elaborate on Justice Douglas's formulation, but
"instead switched ... to the more conventional, but no more satisfactory, 'substantive due process' ground");
Posner, Legal Reasoning, supra note 87, at 445 (discussing Justice Douglas's "general (or at least generalizable)
principle of sexual liberty" and explaining that "no judge has picked up this particular spear and tried to throw it
farther").
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But simply because the basis for Blackmun's opinion was inadequate does
not mean that the right to abortion is not one of constitutional dimension.
Liberals rightly recognize this and have advanced a number of different textual
bases for the right to abortion-hence the moniker the "Wandering Jew" of
Constitutional Scholarship. Professors Lawrence Tribe and Andrew Koppelman
think the right to an abortion is validated by the Thirteenth Amendment's
abolition of involuntary servitude.89 Ronald Dworkin believes the right can be
found in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.9°
Catharine MacKinnon and Cass Sunstein were early advocates of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 9' The Equal Protection argument has
subsequently attracted numerous scholars as the strongest textual argument for
the right to choose.92
Tribe's Thirteenth Amendment approach is unpersuasive. He analogizes to
slavery and argues that the law should not require women to be "good
Samaritans" and offer "aid" to the fetuses they carry (because in no other context
does the law compel such a burden).93 This argument is problematic for a number
of reasons: the law does require persons to aid those they placed in a position of
peril; the law does impose special duties on the parent-child relationship; and
"the mother is not a stranger."94 Even fellow academics, the group that would
perhaps be most receptive to Tribe's novel approach, do not seem interested.95
89. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1354-56 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990).
90. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: How and Whether Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 381, 418-25 (1992); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 160 (1994) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
LIFE'S DOMINION]. Some have defended its current home. See, e.g., Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and
Judicial Review; Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293 (1986); Philip B. Heymann &
Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973).
91. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-44 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Neutrality]; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1319-23 (1991).
92. See, e.g., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6. Just as this paper was going
through the final editing process, UC-Berkeley's Daniel Farber published a book on the Ninth Amendment that
contends that the Ninth Amendment might be the best textual basis for the abortion right. See DANIEL FARBER,
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS
DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007) [hereinafter FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE]. After a lucid historical
survey of the Framers views on the Ninth Amendment and unenumerated rights, Farber sketches out what a
Ninth Amendment approach to abortion would look like. Id. at 111-20.
93. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1354.
94. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 289. And, of course, all these same arguments
highlight the problem in Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous philosophical defense of abortion, which Tribe also
cites approvingly. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 47 (1971).
Additionally, it is interesting to note that in one of the lionized liberal defenses of abortion rights utilizing the
Good Samaritan heuristic, the author himself doubted the cogency of his argument. See Donald Regan,
Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). On the last page of his article, Regan writes,
"[s]ometimes the argument of this essay seems to me an adequate constitutional justification of the result in
Roe. Sometimes it does not." Id. at 1646.
95. See generally WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 6 (explaining where none of the
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Moreover, Tribe's argument is easily exploitable, both rhetorically and
politically.96 Relying on the involuntary servitude clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment would not help squelch the already overheated debate over abortion
and prove better than Justice Blackmun's justification; it leaves him open to an
easy attack that he is equating pregnancy with slavery.97 Tribe also dismisses as
"jejune" a "legislative solution" to the abortion issue,9" by stating that its "fatal
flaw" is "that it presumes that fundamental rights can properly be reduced to
political interests." 99 But the continuing debate surrounding Roe is motivated by
the lack of consensus on the fundamentality of the right to abortion. Tribe's
answer to whether the right to an abortion should be constitutionally protected
assumes that very fact.
Dworkin's attempt proves similarly unworkable.' °° He constructs an intricate
argument, parts of which are very convincing. For example, he forcefully argues
that pro-life rhetoric asserting that a fetus has legal rights from conception
onward is inconsistent with the actions of its advocates.' ° ' However, his central
participants adopted a Thirteenth Amendment justification).
96. Although these factors surely play a role in the Court's decision-making process. See, e.g., DAVID
G. BARNUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 287-99 (1993) (discussing how the interplay
between the Court and public opinion); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 96 (1998)
(discussing the strategic decision-making process of the justices).
97. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1354. The attack is unsophisticated to be sure, but
it would be no doubt politically and rhetorically effective. In any event, it is worth noting that the same
problems plagued Tribe's book-length effort, aimed at a general audience, to tone down the abortion debate. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 7 (1990). It took a severe beating among
academic reviewers. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Tribal Conflict Over Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 595, 596-97
(1991) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)) ("Tribe makes
concessions in tone and in rationale, he makes none in result. His bottom line is to favor constitutional
protection of women's unlimited access to abortion prior to fetal viability."); Stephen L. Carter, Abortion,
Absolutism, and Compromise, 100 YALE L.J. 2747, 2750 (1991) (reviewing same) ("[Pro-life] reader[s] ... will
likely come away frustrated."); Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 265, 275-76 (1993) (reviewing same) (criticizing Tribe for failing to mention in his general audience book
that he has been heavily involved in pro-choice advocacy); Joan Mahoney, The Continuing Clash, 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1231, 1232 (1991) (reviewing same) (explaining that Tribe's book is a "failure" both in its putative
compromise and its attempt to present itself as objective); Isabel Marcus, Many Realities, Many Words:
Abortion and the Struggle Over Meaning, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1991) (reviewing same) (questioning
Tribe's decision to portray himself as a neutral observer when he is in fact "located deep within the adversarial
fray"); Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181, 1184 (1991) (reviewing same) ("Tribe made almost no attempt to acquaint himself with the pro-life
position as it has been articulated by anti-abortion ethicists, scientists, historians, and constitutional lawyers.").
98. This solution is, of course, overturning Roe and sending the issue back to the state legislatures.
99. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1351, 1358.
100. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 90.
101. Id. at 31. If people really believed that abortion kills a human person they would be obligated to
treat abortion, criminally, in substantially the same way as murder. However, abortion has never been treated in
such manner. See POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 275-76; see also Reva Siegel, Reasoning From
the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44. STAN. L.
REV. 261, 317, 318-19 n. 237 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning From the Body] (noting that even
Nineteenth Century legislative efforts to punish abortion as murder could not even make it out of committee and
that doctors, who were the prime movers behind the legislative campaign did not expect it to punished that
severely).
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argument is that people's views on abortion are based on "a shared belief in the
sanctity of human life," which is ultimately a religious belief. Therefore, a law
banning abortion violates the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses because it foists one group's religious beliefs on the whole of
society.' °2 However, there is nothing to compel this conclusion. What if a
legislature passed a law restricting abortion based on secular findings of fact?' °3
Moreover, there is Warren Court era precedent that explicitly states that simply
because legislation overlaps with religious beliefs does not mean it ipso facto
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause. °4
Anyways, Dworkin's definition of what qualifies as a religious belief-a
"belief in the objective and intrinsic importance of human life"'t 5-is stunningly
broad. t 6 One wonders exactly how judges, who are not equipped to divine
ecclesiastical matters, would perform Dworkin's balancing test-"a test of
content," in which the content is whether a belief raises the "essentially
religious" issue of a "particular conception of why and how human life is
sacred"'° 7-in any sort of principled fashion.0 8
The Equal Protection Clause is far and away the most cogent of the
alternative textual homes proposed for the abortion right, and scholars have
congealed around it.' °9 There is no need to replicate here the normative and
doctrinal argument for finding an abortion right in the equal protection clause, as
it has been propounded many times elsewhere"0
However, the equal protection argument, as it has been developed in the
literature, is not without its problems. It is possibly problematic to utilize this
argument on behalf of the female gender when a significant portion of women
are pro-life (and therefore do not feel discriminated against)."' There is also the
contention of some economists, whose models posit that abortion hurts women in
102. Id. at 175.
103. See, e.g., TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1349-50.
104. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) ("blue law" requiring businesses to be closed on
Sundays did not violate Establishment Clause).
105. Id. at 162-63.
106. Posner, Legal Reasoning, supra note 87, at 443-44.
107. See DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 90, at 165.
108. Id. at 161-62. For other criticisms of Dworkin's approach to the abortion issue see Frances M.
Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of LIFE'S DOMINION, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 160 (1995);
Book Note, Inside Out, Within and Beyond, or Backwards?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1994).
109. See, e.g., GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 40-47 (arguing that abortion law pre-
Roe deprived poor women, especially minority women, of their right to equal protection of the law because they
could not obtain the relatively safe, quasi-legal abortions affluent white women procured on the gray market);
Balkin, Genetic Technologies, supra note 6, at 3 (arguing for the abortion right to rest on the Equal Protection
Clause because "[in the particular world we live in today, with its technological limitations and expectations
about economic life and family structure, women must possess a right to abortion as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for securing their equal citizenship"); see also Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 91, at 29-44.
110. See supra notes 6, 91, 92. See generally Siegel, Reasoning From the Body, supra note 101.
11. See GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 144, 205 (collecting numerous studies on
this point).
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the marriage market who refuse to engage in pre-marital sex."2 Prominent
sociologist Kristin Luker, on the basis of her interviews with pro-life activists,
concluded that women who hold more traditional values are hurt by legalized
abortion because it devalues them in the marriage market, and "undermines the
social value on their presence once within a marriage.""' 3 This research raises the
question of whether "we [can] rightly call antiabortion laws even prima facie
discriminatory against women if in fact they help some women and hurt
others?"' 14 It is also worthwhile to note that the equal protection rationale has
never commanded anything close to a majority of the justices' recognition,
although the plurality opinion in Casey did wave at the equality argument."5
However, many of these ostensible issues are not significant obstacles.
D. Scholarly Stalemate
While liberal legal academics have championed these alternative textual
bases in an effort to shore up the abortion right, almost no one has systematically
explored another intriguing possibility: Justice Douglas's unfortunately named
penumbra and emanations formulation ' 6 (although Mark Tushnet has written a
short paper about the possibility of such a revival). ' 7 Of course, this has much to
112. See supra note 22.
113. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 209 (1984).
114. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 341.
115. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) ("The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives."). It is also worthwhile to note that Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gonzales referenced
the equality argument, citing Reva Siegel's scholarship in her dissent. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610
(2007) (citing Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992)).
116. It is worth noting that the penumbral formulation so often mocked by conservatives was used, prior
to Douglas's invocation, "more that twenty times in previous Supreme Court opinions," and a jurist no less
deified than Oliver Wendell Holmes used it in a law review article and "in four Supreme Court opinions."
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 53, at 264. Leamed Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, and Felix
Frankfurter also made use of the term. Id.
117. Tushnet, Jurisprudence of Privacy, supra note 49, at 78-80 (making a persuasive argument that
Justice Douglas's penumbral formulation was "hardly incoherent" and that his interpretive method contained at
least the germ of a sophisticated textualist argument). See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 748 (1999) ("Here is another feature of the Constitution: various words and phrases recur in the
document. This feature gives interpreters yet another set of clues as they search for constitutional meaning and
gives rise to yet another rich technique of constitutional interpretation. I call this technique intratextualism.").
Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that Justice Douglas's approach is unsophisticated because it cannot avoid
substantive due process; the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, Chemerinsky points out, have all been
incorporated against the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.3.2 (2d ed. 2002). There is of course a connection between the
doctrine of incorporation and substantive due process: Incorporated rights fall under the substantive due process
umbrella. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 27, at 835. So, Chemerinsky's argument goes, while Justice Douglas
explicitly stated in Griswold that he was avoiding (what he believed to be) the albatross of Lochner, he
neglected the fact that the enumerated rights found in the Bill of Rights are incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause; voila, substantive due process. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
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do with the disdain leveled at Justice Douglas's approach. And as often as Justice
Douglas's opinion is castigated, Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman is
celebrated. But a close reading of his opinion illuminates the central tension in
substantive due process doctrine.
Written in 1961, Justice Harlan's lyrical dissent includes a passage defining
the contours of his conception of substantive due process: "[tihus, I would not
suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.""' 8 But it is difficult to reconcile
this position with his pliable and expansive language: "[Due process] is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints and which also recognizes, what
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require parti-
cularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment."'" 9
In 1961, it was simply not a question of whether the state could regulate
homosexual behavior; an argument to the contrary would have been beyond the
pale for a constitutional lawyer to make.'2° However, any justice or advocate
worth his salt could, in later years, massage that argument from Justice Harlan's
language as social mores and norms changed. Put differently, substantive due
481-82; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) ("The question has been asked whether a right is
among those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions' . . . whether it is 'basic in our system of jurisprudence' . . . and whether it is 'a fundamental right"')
(citations omitted); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (explaining that, in
deciding whether an unenumerated fundamental right exists, the Court looks to liberties that are "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (explaining that the
unenumerated right to procreate is fundamental because it "involves one of the basic civil rights of man").
But while Chemerinsky is technically correct that Justice Douglas cannot avoid a branch of the
substantive due process tree, it is inescapable that incorporation, as a form of substantive due process, is pass6.
What raises the ire of conservative justices, judges, and academics is not the incorporation of the First
Amendment's freedom of speech or the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel-even a conservative as firebrand
as Judge Bork admits 'Those battles are long over," see That Delicate Balance I: Our Bill of Rights-The First
Amendment and Hate Speech (PBS television broadcast Dec. 14, 1991)-but instead the question of
unenumerated rights is their major point of contention, or at least those unenumerated rights that they disagree
with politically. See Tushnet, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 38, at 212. Although there is no doubt an
interesting legal-historical discussion about incorporation as evidenced by Akhil Reed Amar's book, The Bill of
Rights, and the scholarship surrounding it. See Steven Calabresi, Book Review, We Are All Federalists, We Are
All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L. J. 2273, 2273-2305 (1999)).
In other words, Chemerinsky has the answer to a question scholars no longer find interesting. Which is
unfortunate because I think Chemerinsky misses something very rich about Justice Douglas's novel, though
much criticized formulation about the right to privacy (criticism that, in my view, is a bit unfair). Tushnet,
Jurisprudence of Privacy, supra note 49. Richard Posner has also noted that Justice Douglas was perhaps on to
something, but articulated his penumbral theory "in his usual slipshod way." Posner, Legal Reasoning, supra
note 87, at 445. In another writing, Tushnet called Douglas's approach "actually quite intelligent." Mark
Tushnet, Comments from the Contributors, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 3, at 251.
See also POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 335-36 (arguing that despite being "rhetorical ly]
maladroit[]", Justice Douglas's formulation "could have been made more respectable by further elaboration and
application").
118. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
120. See Tushnet, Self-Historicism, supra note 37, at 773-75.
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process is surely, as conservatives charge, a vehicle for "discovering new rights"
as society changes. But to conservatives, this is bad constitutional law; this
predecessor to the sexual autonomy line of cases showcases "mere political
preference, undermining the judicial function." 2'
This criticism is somewhat naive. It should come as no surprise that Justice
Harlan's opinion expresses his policy preferences. It is also unsurprising that the
type of expansive language and reasoning in his opinion could lead to the
constitutionalization of new rights (even those that Harlan did not feel should, or
could, be protected by his version of substantive due process) as old justices
retired and new justices with a different ideological viewpoint were confirmed.'
But conservatives who dislike creation of "new" rights "out of whole cloth" 2' are
arguably not dealing in constitutional law reality. 24 They fail to explain how this
ostensibly proper "judicial function"-apparently, making sure judges do not
make countermajoritarian decisions-is informed by the putatively robust
attitudinal model.' 2' They gloss over the political valence in Justice Scalia's and
Justice Thomas's originalism: selective reinterpretation of history and tradition to
"remold the Constitution to express contemporary conservative political
values.' '2 6 This belies the implicit charge that only a liberal judge injects his
121. Lund& McGinnis, supra note 7, at 1608.
122. Balkin & Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, supra note 11, at 1064-72.
123. This is a favorite phrase of conservative pundits. See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Uphill Fight: Can
John Roberts Restore the Constitutional Order, NAT'L REV., Aug. 29, 2005, at 32 (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
124. See Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Constitution, SLATE,
Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/ [hereinafter Balkin, Alive and Kicking] (on file with
McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that originalists are more interested in picking those doctrines and decisions
that agree with their political priors so that "strict scrutiny for federal affirmative action stays, but the right of
privacy goes"). And, to be fair, most conservatives do not want to end the recognition of unenumerated rights,
they simply want to cabin the "discovery" of them to those they find politically palatable.
125. SEGAL & SPAETH, THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL, supra note 8, at 86. Of course, while a judge's
"attitude" certainly has a strong explanatory component, the judge's attitude does not fill out the whole picture.
For example, Cass Sunstein's work exploring the robustness of the attitudinal model at the circuit court level
shows that policy preferences indeed play a large role, but perhaps more interestingly, the political makeup of
the court's panel is just as robust. See CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 41-45 (2006) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?] (arguing
that if a Republican judge is on the same panel with two Democratic judges he is more likely to cast a liberal
vote; the same holds true, in the opposite direction, when a Democratic judge is on a panel with two Republican
judges); see also Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist Approaches to Judicial
Politics, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 606, 622 (2000) (noting the strength of the attitudinal model-"its
ability to muster quantitative evidence" in support of it-and its weaknesses: "[t]he attitudinalist model tells us
a great deal about how a given justice is likely to vote in a case that raises particular issues, but it tells us little
about how such cases arose, how those issues had been framed, and why the justices approach their task in these
ways"); see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 132
(1996) (calling the empirical evidence for the attitudinal model "somewhat weak" given its reliance on
newspaper editorials written at the time of justice's nomination to classify her as liberal or conservative);
Stephen Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of
Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & SOC. INQ. 89, 95 (2005) (noting that if Segal's and Spaeth's
denigration of the legal model has any explanatory power, it is based "their cramped vision" ).
126. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living
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policy preferences into judicial decisions while originaism ' embodies "the
[proper] judicial function" (a function which, in any case, is a quixotic notion
that simply does not square with political reality).' 28 Finally, this blinkered
approach ignores insights from the "new institutionalist" branch of political
science showing that the justices act strategically and are constrained by the other
political institutions and actors' reactions and preferences, not to mention the
historical and cultural underpinnings of the Court's opinions. 29 McGinnis's and
Lund's (and presumably Justice Scalia and Michael Paulsen) conception of the
proper judicial function-a normatively conservative one-simply ignores the
positive scholarship and it impoverishes their approach.'
30
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562 (2006) (arguing that Scalia's and Thomas's originalism relies on
anachronism and ideology when deployed in favor of conservative goals such as state sovereign immunity,
affirmative action, commercial speech, and Bush v. Gore); Balkin, Alive and Kicking, supra note 124; Jeffrey
Rosen, Originalist Sin, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26 (reviewing Justice Scalia's A Matter of
Interpretation and arguing that he will abandon his originalism when it conflicts with his true concern:
protecting traditional values).
127. For a critique of the originalist position that applies with equal force to its current incarnation, see
TUSHNET, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 41 (discussing the incoherence of the originalists goal of
cabining judicial discretion by relying on what is ultimately an indeterminate historical inquiry). Tushnet was
writing when the framers' intent was in originalist vogue. When that approach was devastated, it moved to the
ratifiers' intent. Today, originalists want us to determine "how the public would have understood and applied
the Constitution's words at the time they were adopted." Balkin, Alive and Kicking, supra note 122. As noted
above, Balkin has "converted" to originalism. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 4.
128. See Friedman, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 333 ("Judicial review can be understood as
attractive precisely because it is embedded in politics, but is not quite of it. Politics and law are not separate,
they are symbiotic. It would be remarkable to believe judicial review could operate entirely independent of
politics or would be tolerated as such. Nor is it clear that this would be desirable given social and constitutional
commitments to accountability and checks and balances. The practice of judicial review is valuable in that it
serves as one more counterweight, like many others in our constitutional system.").
129. For example, "rational choice institutionalism." See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, On the Struggle
for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 87 (1996) (discussing the paradigmatic example of Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison and how it artfully resolved the issue in the case without placing the
Court's nascent institutional power in jeopardy). This barely scratches the surface of rich positive political
literature. For example, Cornell Clayton, a "historical new institutionalist," argues that the attitudinal model is
to a certain extent reductive. Cornell Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old
Institutionalism, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 22-30 (Cornell
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter DECISION-MAKING]; see also Charles Epp, External
Pressure and the Supreme Court's Agenda, in DECISION-MAKING 255-79 (undercutting attitudinalists who
argue that the justices grant certiorari to cases to pursue their personal political goals by noting that the justices
can only take those cases that are litigated, and if the ACLU, for example, ceased to bring lawsuits it would be
difficult for the judges to pursue a civil liberties agenda as aggressively); see also Cornell Clayton
& Howard Gillman, Introduction, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (Howard Gillman &
Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) (describing the new institutionalism as "[sicholars seeking to explore the broader
cultural and political contexts of judicial decision making"); Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993) [Graber, The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty].
130. To be fair, McGinnis and Lund would likely respond that a good originalist approach to
adjudication obviates all these problems, no matter what Justices Scalia and Thomas do in practice.
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The central point is that most of the normative conservative foot-stomping on
Roe is unpersuasive because it fails to address insights from other disciplines
regarding the judicial decision-making process. The result is an unrealistic
conception of judicial behavior.' In addition to making arguments that are
undercut by the insights of other disciplines, conservatives' legal arguments are
misguided. For example, there is the old saw that substantive due process is a
constitutional oxymoron because due process only ensures proper procedures.
3
John Hart Ely famously wrote that substantive due process is like identifying a
color as "green pastel redness."'33 But this is sophistic. As noted above,
substantive due process has a substantial jurisprudential pedigree and its use in
protecting substantive rights against government interference is not as incoherent
as its critics allege. 34 Moreover, had it not been for the Slaughterhouse Cases
emptying the Privileges or Immunities Clause-a clause legal scholars of
differing political persuasions believe protects unenumerated rights'3 -of any
meaning,'36 the fight over what substantive rights the Due Process Clause protects
would instead center on ascertaining what unenumerated rights the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protects. Instead of asking whether the right to abortion is a
liberty interest, the issue would be whether it is a privilege or immunity of
citizenship. "Substantive due process" (i.e., unenumerated rights) would merely
have relocated to a different constitutional address (although maybe a more
textually and historically sound one). Put another way, the Slaughterhouse Cases
only shifted the venue of the fight, not whether there would be a fight at all.
Nor is the conservative vision of substantive due process, upon reflection,
appealing. According to conservatives, the Due Process Clause protects only
those fundamental rights that are "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
131. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1998).
132. Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 3, at 202-03.
133. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980).
Professor Ely, it hardly needs mentioning, wrote one of the first, and most cited, salvos in the scholarly debate
over the soundness of Roe, arguing, in another oft-quoted passage, that "[Roe] is bad because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try
to be." John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973)
(emphasis in original).
134. See supra note 37; see also James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in
the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315, 315 (1999) (showing that the Due Process
Clause has a long history in the state and federal courts of being invoked to protect substantive rights).
135. Randy Barnett, whose constitutional thinking could be classified as libertarian, speaks favorably of
Michael Kent Curtis's book, which was one of the first to defend the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a
source for unenumerated rights. Randy Barnett, Who's Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1, 1 (2006). Akhil Reed Amar, a liberal textualist, has also shown in his book, The Bill of Rights, that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause could be a source of unenumerated rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 120-23, 180 (1999). Noted conservative scholar and jurist Judge Michael McConnell argues that
unenumerated rights should be "based not on the normative judgments of courts, but on constitutional text
supplemented by the tradition and experience of the nation." McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 14, at
666.
136. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1870).
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history, legal traditions, and practices," because such indicia "provide the crucial
guideposts for responsible decision-making." '37  Under Justice Scalia's
approach-trumpeted by McGinnis and Lund-the prospective right should be
analyzed at "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified," which means that no
more unenumerated rights will be recognized (at least not any liberal rights in a
conservative majority court).'38 Bowers v. Hardwick is the textbook example: by
making what was inherently an ideological choice to frame the issue as to
whether the Constitution protects "a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy,"'' 39 Justice White made it almost comically easy to swat his
own softball out of the park. Lawrence Tribe and Michael Dorf, in a critique of
this argument, have shown that "the choice of cognizable traditions involves
value judgments.' ' 40 That is to say, it will always be possible to frame an issue so
that the measuring stick of "the most specific level" will be too high for
disfavored litigants.' 4' The Michael H. and Glucksberg substantive due process
model is pleasing to conservatives because it means that a justice following it
will be hard-pressed to recognize any "new" rights that conservatives do not find
politically palatable.
Finally, the conservative objection that Roe took the issue away from the
political process is specious. 42 Historian David Garrow, who wrote what is
widely regarded as the definitive history of the pro-choice movement, has shown
that, prior to Roe, motivated pro-lifers were able to defeat, roll-back, or seriously
threaten much of the legislative successes of the pro-choice movement, even in
137. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). Conservatives were ecstatic when
Glucksberg came down; Judge Michael McConnell wrote an article emphatically stating that "the constitutional
methodology under which Roe was decided has been repudiated." McConnell, The Right to Die, supra note 14,
at 666.
138. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989); see Lund & McGinnis, supra note 7, at
1608.
139. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
140. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1057, 1087 (1990) [hereinafter Tribe & Dorf, Levels of Generality]. Jack Balkin argues that, in any event,
the entire debate misses the point; that "[tihe proper level of generality for the constitutional principles in the
text is the one we find in the text itself." Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 67. That is, if the
text is vague and general (like "equal protection of the laws" or "due process"), then we know to read it at a
relatively high level of generality, whereas rule-like text must be read more narrowly. Id. at 65-70.
141. See Tribe & Dorf, Levels of Generality, supra note 140, at 1057. For example, a conservative
justice could frame the abortion issue as whether there is a recognizable tradition to destroy, with the woman's
permission, a genetically human entity in her uterus.
142. This objection goes to the heart of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." However, "obsession with
the 'counter-majoritarian difficulty"' is an academic concern that has outlived much of its usefulness. Friedman,
Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 267. Additionally, Harvard's Richard Fallon, in a fascinating exercise, shows
that it is "not just a fallacy. It is a delusion" to believe that overturning Roe would extricate the courts from
having to decide abortion-related constitutional issues. Richard Fallon, If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and
the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. Louis L.J. 611, 648 (2007).
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the face of popular support for some sort of change in the status quo.143 In
addition, Reva Siegel and Robert Post, building on Garrow's work, knock down
the notion that Roe immediately created a pro-life "backlash," arguing instead
that it was not until the late-1970s that the social conservative movement began
to use Roe as a political weapon.'" Lastly, there is abundant evidence that the
political elite, especially Republican lawmakers, are happy with having the
political hot potato of abortion being in the judicial branch.4 5
And this ties into the important but ignored fact that a majority of American
citizens have long said, and continue to say that they do not want Roe v. Wade
overturned. 46 Granted, for most Americans, support for abortion remains con-
textual:'4 7 when a women's life is endangered, eighty-two percent of Americans
support an abortion right in the first trimester (the number drops to seventy-five
percent in the third trimester), but the number plummets to forty-one percent
when the woman simply just does not want the child (and just twenty-four
percent would support that same decision in the third trimester).' 48 The numbers
have remained remarkably consistent over time, at least for those who believe
that abortion should sometimes be allowed.' 49 Perhaps most importantly, Gallup
Polls show that while there is solid support for legal abortion, "most Americans
support the kind of chipping-around-the-edges limits on abortion that many states
143. See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 53, at 482-83, 484, 496, 546-47, 576-77
(1994); see also David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB.
L. REV. 833, 840-41 (2006).
144. Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash 39-52 (Yale
Law School, Working Paper No. 131, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=990968 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
145. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 129, at 58 (collecting studies which show that
state legislators "would rather the issue.., go away" or simply thought that it should "not be a public policy
issue or that the federal judiciary should resolve the matter"). Jeffrey Rosen, The Day After Roe, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, June 2006, http://www.theatlantic.comdoc/290606/roe (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Rosen makes a persuasive case that GOP legislators do not want to be forced to move from "symbolic"
opposition to Roe to an actual floor vote given public opinion on the abortion issue. See also Debate Club,
Should Liberals Stop Defending Roe?: Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin Debate, LEGAL AFF., Nov. 28,
2005, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-ayotte1105.msp (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (Professor Levinson argued that "I am increasingly persuaded that the principal beneficiary of the
current struggle to maintain Roe is the Republican Party"); GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 53,
at 490-91 (noting that a Texas state legislator was hoping, as early as 1971, that "the Supreme Court decide [the
abortion issue] for us").
146. In response to a Gallup Poll taken in January 2006, sixty-six percent of surveyed Americans stated
they were opposed to overturning Roe, compared with sixty-three percent answering the same way in July 2005
and fifty-five percent in May 2006; the percentages of those in favor of overruling Roe ranged from twenty-five
to thirty-two percent. See Gallup Poll, Gallup's Pulse of Democracy: Abortion, http://www.galluppoll.
com/content/default.aspx?ci=1576&pg=l (last visited May 30, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
It is a well-recited but important fact that the polls have consistently shown that most Americans support some
form of legalized abortion; according to the most recent Gallup polls numbers, eighty-three percent of
Americans think that abortion should be legal in all or certain circumstances, with fifty-three percent answering
"only under certain circumstances." Id. Fifteen percent felt that abortion should always be illegal. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. (showing fifty-four percent with the same answer in 1975; fifty-two percent in 1981; fifty-
seven percent in 1988; fifty-one percent in 1994; fifty-nine percent in 1998; and fifty-seven percent in 2003).
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have enacted in recent years, and that continue to be promoted in others: parental
consent for minors, informed consent for women, spousal consent, and laws that
would prohibit the specific procedure known as 'partial-birth abortion.""' 5  It
should come as no surprise that the restrictions approved in Casey run mostly
parallel to public opinion on those restrictions; political scientists have shown
that there is a strong correlation between public opinion and the Court's
decisions.' Seen from an empirical and historical perspective, it is difficult to
understand conservative objections that the federal judiciary has usurped the
people's will.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Commenting on abortion-related legal scholarship, Stephen Carter wrote that
[O]ne longs for something new, an idea that will shake things up, but as
each new article or book comes out, one is left with the dreadful and yet
unavoidable sense that everything has been said. Not only that, but most
of it was said ten years ago. Whatever arguments for free choice Justice
Blackmun might have omitted in his comprehensive but unsatisfying
majority opinion in Roe v. Wade have long since been filled in, and the
basic pro-life argument, that the fetus should be protected for its real or
potential personhood, is restated in lots of clever ways but is still only
restated. As eyes glaze over, it often has seemed during the past two
decades that only the names of the authors who offer the arguments have
changed.
52
This statement, written sixteen years ago, rings even more true today.
For all the inroads that empiricism and social science have made into other
areas of law, they have been under-utilized in constitutional law. 53 The goal of
this paper is to move away from only utilizing normative theoretical arguments
150. Id.
151. Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1018 (2004) (advancing thesis that the
justices are "highly responsive to public mood"); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court
as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 87, 96 (1993). For a less empirical but equally interesting study, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000). See also Friedman, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 322
n.365 (collecting numerous studies by political scientists finding the same correlation).
152. Carter, supra note 97, at 2747.
153. However, this is beginning to get some attention from scholars; in February 2007, the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law held a symposium titled "Positive Approaches to Constitutional
Law and Theory." See University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, The 2007 Journal of
Constitutional Law Symposium, http://www.law.upenn.edu/conlaw/symposium.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). Also, leading legal scholars have begun to, and exhorted others to, incorporate the
contribution of political scientists rather than simply grind out more normative scholarship. See, e.g., MARK
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003); Friedman, Judicial Review, supra note 1; Balkin,
Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 89.
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and examine the empirical evidence.'54 What, then, are the "known facts"'55 about
abortion in America?
56
A. Higher Abortion Rates, Less Late Term Abortions
Not surprisingly, the abortion rate increased considerably after Roe v.
Wade' 57-although this is mostly attributable to more accurate statistics reflecting
abortion's legality, not increased reliance on the procedure.'58 The abortion rate
continued to rise until 1981, leveled off, and began to decline in the 1990s,
settling in at slightly over 1.3 million in 2000.159 To put the numbers in a
somewhat clearer context, in 1996, slightly more than one in five pregnancies
(21.9%) resulted in abortion. '60 During the 1990s, the pregnancy rate also
diminished but at a far more rapid pace, declining over twenty percent from 1989
to 1996. 61
Moreover, an overwhelming number of abortions occur during early
pregnancy. Just under ninety percent of all abortions are performed before the
twelve week gestation point (or the first trimester), and nearly all abortions
(ninety-eight percent) are performed by twenty weeks. 6 2 Dilation and extraction
abortions, better known by their politicized moniker "partial-birth abortion," are
rare. There were an estimated 650 such abortions in 1996.163 To put that number
into context, there were 1.4 million total abortions performed in 1996. However,
154. Of course, positive research merely tells us the state of things. One still has to make normative
conclusions based on the state of things.
155. Graber, Constitutional Politics, supra note 17, at 325.
156. I will use almost exclusively data from the United States for this portion of the paper because I
think it is important to understand the circumstances of abortion in America. This should not be taken as
meaning that I think other countries' experiences aren't informative-I do; for example, Mary Ann Glendon's
book Abortion and Divorce in Western Law was no doubt a valuable addition to the literature on the subject.
157. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States,
35 PERSP. SEX. & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 6-8 (2003), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/joumals/
3500603.pdf. This paper was published by the Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI) which is considered by social
scientists to have the most accurate abortion data available. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. MCFARLANE & KENNETH J.
MEIER, THE POLITICS OF FERTILITY CONTROL 112 (2001) [hereinafter MCFARLANE & MEIER, FERTILITY
CONTROL]. This is because the AGI, as opposed the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), collects its data
directly from abortion providers, while the CDC relies on state health departments. LEVINE, SEX AND
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 20. For example, four states, including California, refused to report their
abortion data to the CDC. Finer & Henshaw, supra, at 7. These states account for eighteen percent of all
reported abortions. Id.
158. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 21; GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra
note 17, at 65.
159. Finer & Henshaw, supra note 157, at 8 tbl.1.
160. STEPHANIE J. VENTURA & CHRISTINE A. BACHRACH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1999 48 (2000). The abortion rate,
and pregnancy rate, is based on the number of incidences per 1,000 women aged 15-44. Id.
161. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 23.
162. Cynthia C. Harper, Jillian T. Henderson & Phillip D. Darney, Abortion in the United States, 26
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 501, 504 (2005).
163. Finer & Henshaw, supra note 157, at 8.
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caution should be exercised in interpreting data on partial birth abortions
"because projections based on such small numbers are subject to error.'
64
Finally, while there has been no empirical research on intact dilation and
extraction, given the microscopic rate at which it occurs, economic models
suggest that restrictions on its use would have negligible effect on abortion
policy. 165
In short, legalized abortion leads to an increase in abortion rates, a lower
birth rate, and few "partial-birth abortions."'66
B. Increased Access and Lower Costs
Legalizing abortion, as a whole, increased access to and lowered costs for
women obtaining the procedure. The geographic distribution of abortion is
informative: according to Finer and Henshaw, women in California, New York,
New Jersey, Florida, Illinois, and Texas account for fifty-five percent of all
abortions (while they account for only forty percent of the female population
ages fifteen to forty-four). 167 The vast majority of abortions, ninety-three percent,
are performed in abortion clinics or some other kind of clinic, with only five
percent being performed in hospitals.' 68 Virtually all abortions, ninety-eight
percent, are performed in urban and metropolitan areas. 169 This means that very
164. Id.
165. Id. at 183. Before moving on, I must note that Steven Levitt's and John J. Donohue's path-breaking
and controversial research in the area of abortion is being purposefully ignored. Their most famous paper
concerned the effect of legalizing abortion on crime rates. See Donohue & Levitt, supra note 195. There, they
argued that "legalized abortion has contributed significantly to recent crime reductions." Id. at 349. Their theory
was contested (both in academia and in the mainstream press) and economist Ted Joyce responded with a paper
arguing that Donohue and Levitt had it wrong; the decrease in crime was actually due to the waning of the crack
cocaine epidemic. See Ted Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?, 39 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 1 (2004).
Donohue and Levitt replied, arguing that due to some statistical measurement errors not only was Joyce wrong,
but it turns out that effect of abortion on crime are probably underestimated. John J. Donohue, III & Steven D.
Levitt, Further Evidence that Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime, 39 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 29, 29-30, 47-48
(2004). It is worth noting that other researchers have found that legalization of abortion has reduced the youth
homicide rate among men, both white and non-white, although there was a minimal effect on women of the
same age. Richard A. Berk et al., The Legalization of Abortion and Subsequent Youth Homicide: A Time Series
Analysis, 3 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISS. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 45 (2003). They do note, however, that Joyce's crack-
cocaine hypothesis may contribute for part of their findings. Id. at 61.
However, and this is an important however, the issue remains an open question in the field and other
prominent economists who have studied the issue have concluded that more research needs to be done before
the "winner(s)" can be determined. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 172-73 (noting that
"additional study in this area is needed before we can draw firm conclusions"); see also Klick, Econometric
Analyses, supra note 189, at 776 (noting that at this point, due to lack of data, it is difficult "one way or the
other on the larger issue of the relationship between abortion access and general crime statistics").
166. Philip Levine et al., Roe v. Wade and American Fertility, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 199 (1999).
167. Finer & Henshaw, supra note 157, at 9. The states with the lowest abortion rates are Kentucky,
South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States, 1987-88, 22
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 102 (1990).
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few abortion providers are located in rural counties. It is well known that the
number of abortion providers has been decreasing: "there were [thirty-seven]
percent fewer abortion providers in 2000 compared to those performing the
procedure in 1982.,, 170 It is estimated that eighty-seven percent of counties in the
United States have no abortion provider at all. 7 ' However, only thirty-four
percent of women of childbearing age actually live in those counties, a fact often
glossed over by pro-choice partisans. Furthermore, of the thirty-four percent of
women who live in a county without an abortion provider, only eight percent
have to travel more than fifty miles to reach a provider.'7 ' Traveling to obtain an
abortion, then, is not an obstacle for the vast majority of women. 171
C. Demographics. Abortion is Common but not a Birth Control Substitute
Nearly half of all women-forty-three percent-will have at least one
abortion prior to the age of forty-five. 74 White, non-Hispanic women account for
40.9% of abortions, while black, non-Hispanic women account for 31.7%.'7
Hispanic women account for 20.1% of abortions, with other races and ethnicities
accounting for 7.3%.176 When we translate those numbers into abortion rates,'
77
the total rate of abortion for all women ages fifteen to forty-four in the year 2000
was twenty-one abortions per thousand women; the abortion rate among black
women of that age group was forty-nine abortions per thousand, compared to
178thirty-three per thousand for Hispanic women, and thirteen for white women.
The teen pregnancy rate has steadily dropping since mid-1980s.179 Abortion rates
for women aged 15-19 was approximately forty-two per thousand in 1986, but
declined to nearly half that amount in 2002.80 Similarly, abortion rates among
women aged 20-24 have also dropped but not at the same pace, from fifty-two
170. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 28.
171. Finer & Henshaw, supra note 157, at 10.
172. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 29.
173. However, the burden of traveling to obtain an abortion has been shown to fall disproportionately on
married, teenage women.
174. Stanley K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 24, 29
(1998), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3002498.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
175. Rachel K. Jones, Jacqueline E. Darroch & Stanley K. Henshaw, Patterns in the Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH
226, 228 tbl.1 (2002).
176. Id. at 228 tbl.1.
177. The abortion rate is the "[niumber of abortions per 1,000 women in [the] relevant subgroup." Id.
178. Id.
179. GUTIMACHER INST., U.S. TEENAGE PREGNANCY STATS.: NAT'L AND STATE TRENDS AND TRENDS
BY RACE AND ETHNICITY (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/09/12fUSTPstats.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
180. Id. at 4 tbl. 1.
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per thousand in 1986 to forty-four in 2002).8 ' Slightly over half of women
obtaining an abortion have not had one before; 7.6% have had three or more."'
Women presenting for a repeat abortion are more likely to be older, physically
abused, and sexually abused than women presenting for their first abortion.' 83
These facts fly in the face of conservatives who callously accuse women of using
abortion as a method of birth control.
Social attitudes are not a predictor of abortion incidence. A high level of
education has consistently been found to indicate support for abortion, with this
effect even stronger in women.'" However, economically disadvantaged women
account for a disproportionate number of abortions.'85 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
opposition to abortion is associated with frequent church attendance and
affiliation with the Catholic and conservative Protestant churches.'86 However,
when beliefs are translated into actions, "Catholics do not abort any more or less
than one would expect based upon their share of the population."' 87 It is also
interesting, but perhaps unsurprising, that when faced with the stark choice, those
who call themselves pro-life are just as apt to have an abortion as other women.88
D. Health Benefits: Safer Procedures, but More Sexually Transmitted Diseases
For women deciding to have an abortion, it seems clear that the legalization
of the procedure has made it safer,'89 and it does not seem to affect women's
chances of having subsequent, wanted pregnancies.' 9° Despite some claims to the
181. Id. at 10 tbl.2.6.
182. U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Abortion Surveillance-United States, 1998
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 7, 2002, at 4, 29 tbl.13, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/
ss5103.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
183. William A. Fisher et al., Characteristics of Women Undergoing Repeat Induced Abortion, 172
CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 637, 637-38 (2005).
184. See, e.g., Nancy J. Davis & Robert V. Robinson, Are the Rumors of War Exaggerated? Religious
Orthodoxy and Moral Progressivism in America, 102 AM. J. Soc. 756, 773 tbl.3 (1996); Donald Granberg,
Conformity to Religious Norms Regarding Abortion, 32 Soc. Q. 267 (1991); Richard J. Harris & Edgar W.
Mills, Religion, Values and Attitudes Toward Abortion, 24 J. Sci. STUDY RELIGION 137, 146, 148 (1985).
185. d.at228tbl.1,231.
186. Michael R. Welch et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among US Catholics: Another Case Study of
Symbolic Politics, 76 Soc. Sc. Q. 142 (1995); Eric L. Woodrum & Beth L. Davison, Reexamination of
Religious Influences on Abortion Attitudes, 33 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 229 (1992). In the time period immediately
after Roe, whites tended to be stronger supporters of abortion rights than blacks, but by the late 1980s the two
groups had flip-flopped. See Strickler & Danigelis, supra note 22, at 195-97.
187. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 30-32.
188. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 10.
189. Jonathan Klick, Econometric Analyses of U.S. Abortion Policy: A Critical Review, 31 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 751, 756 (2004) [hereinafter Klick, Econometric Analyses] (citing a study showing that the fatality
rate for abortions dropped after legalization had taken effect); POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 277
(discussing the drastic drop in maternal death after Roe).
190. B. Adelusi et al., Pregnancy Trends After Abortion, 18 J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 159, 161
(1998).
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contrary,' 9' undergoing an abortion does not increase a woman's chances of
contracting breast cancer.192
Conversely, legalized abortion has probably led to an increase in sexually
transmitted diseases. Economists Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann found
that abortion legalization increased gonorrhea and syphilis rates as much as
twenty-five percent.'93 Similarly, another researcher found a decrease in female
gonorrhea rates when Medicaid funding of abortion was restricted, but not at a
statistically significant level.' 94 Parallel to that, economists have also found that
abortion "induces more sexual conduct or diminished protections against
pregnancy in a way that substantially increases the number of pregnancies."'9'5
The empirical evidence supports the abortion as insurance hypothesis.
E. Public Welfare Spending and Restrictions on Abortion
On balance, public welfare spending for abortion yields greater benefits for
society. A 1990 study found that for each dollar spent nationally on family
planning services, $4.40 was saved "as a result of averting [short-term]
191. Joel Brind and Angela Lanfranchi, co-founders of the Breast Cancer Prevention Institute, have
spearheaded a movement claiming that a link between abortion and breast cancer (the so-called ABC
Syndrome) exists. See, e.g., Joel Brind, Induced Abortion as an Independent Risk Factor for Breast Cancer: A
Critical Review of Recent Studies based on Prospective Data, 10 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 105 (2005).
192. The so-called ABC Syndrome (abortion, breast cancer) has not been proven. In 2003, the National
Cancer Institute, a component of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) convened a workshop of the world's
leading experts in pregnancy and breast cancer. NAT'L CANCER INST., FACT SHEET: ABORTION, MISCARRIAGE,
AND BREAST CANCER RISK (2003), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheetlRisk/abortion-miscarriage (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). They concluded that, after reviewing the population-based, clinical, and
animal studies that had explored the ABC link, abortion or miscarriage did not increase a women's risk of
getting breast cancer. Id. See also NAT'L CANCER INST., U.S. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, SUMMARY REPORT:
EARLY REPRODUCTIVE EVENTS AND BREAST CANCER WORKSHOP (2003), http://www.cancer.gov/cancerinfo/
ere-workshop-report (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
However, in a recent article, Angela Lanfranchi claimed that politics was keeping her research linking
breast cancer and abortion from getting its due, and compared the signing statement by the 100 cancer experts at
the NCI workshop to the 100 scientists who signed a statement coming out against Einstein's theory of
relativity. Angela Lanfranchi, The Science, Studies and Sociology of the Abortion Breast Cancer Link, ASS'N
FOR INTERDISC. RES. IN VALUES AND SOC. CHANGE RES. BULL., 2005, at 6-8, http://www.abortion
breastcancer.com/June 2005.pdf. It is worth noting that the journal that published her research is published by
the Association for Interdisciplinary Research in Values and Social Change, a resolutely pro-life organization.
See Ass'n for Interdisc. Res. in Values and Soc. Change, http://www.abortionresearch.us/home.html (last
visited May 31, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
193. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion Legalization on Sexual Behavior:
Evidence from Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 407, 411-12, 431 (2003). But cf Klick,
Econometric Analyses, supra note 189, at 760-61 (critiquing his own study and noting some of its short-
comings). Klick makes the interesting point that while STDs are a cost to society, the risk may be outweighed
by the pleasures individuals obtain from unsafe sex. Id.
194. Bisakha Sen, A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Restrictions on Medicaid Funding for
Abortions on Female STD Rates, 12 J. HEALTH ECON. 453, 454 (2002).
195. John J. Donohue, III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 379, 386 n.8 (2001).
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expenditures on medical services, welfare and nutritional services."'' 96 In
California, a state that tends to spend more on such services than others, the
savings were even larger: $7.70 saved for each dollar spent on contraceptive
services.'97 A more recent study found that for every dollar spent on publicly
funded contraceptive services, there was a savings "of $3.00 on Medicaid costs
for pregnancy-related and newborn medical care."'198 According to McFarlane and
Meier, "[s]tates that fund abortions for low-income women have substantially
fewer teen births and about one-fourth fewer cases of inadequate prenatal care
than state[s that] do not fund abortions."' 99
Using restrictions on abortion financing and access as their research lens,
Levine, Trainor, and Zimmerman found that when states restricted Medicaid after
1977, 200 their pregnancy rates dropped by around 7.7% .20' A number of other
studies also found decreases-the biggest drops were among low-income
202
women-in the abortion rate (generally around three to five percent). Insofar as
mandatory waiting periods for abortions are concerned, one group of researchers
found, using a case-study approach (Mississippi passed a law requiring a 24-hour
mandatory waiting period20 3), that the number of abortions fell due to the law.
°4
Consistent with the abortion as insurance hypothesis,2 5 they found an inverse
relationship between average distance to an abortion provider and teen birth
rates, affecting only teens living in very rural areas.206 A study by Kane andStaiger suggests that parental involvement laws-e.g. the parental notification
196. Jacqueline Darroch Forrest & Susheela Singh, Public-Sector Savings Resulting From Expenditures
for Contraceptive Services, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 6, 6 (1990).
197. Jacqueline Darroch Forrest & Susheela Singh, The Impact of Public-Sector Expenditures For
Contraceptive Services in California, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 161, 161 (1990).
198. Jacqueline Darroch Forrest & Renee Samara, Impact of Publicly Funded Contraceptive Services on
Unintended Pregnancies and Implications for Medicaid Expenditures, 28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 188, 193 (1996).
199. MACFARLANE AND MEIER, FERTILITY CONTROL, supra note 157, at 139.
200. In 1977, the Supreme Court held that the Social Security Act did not require states to pay for
nontherapeutic abortions in order to participate in the federal-state Medicaid program. See Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 447 (1977). See also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that states are not constitutionally
required to pay for nontherapeutic abortion for indigent women simply because it pays for childbirth expenses).
201. Philip B. Levine et al., The Effect of Medicaid Abortion Funding Restrictions on Abortions,
Pregnancies, and Births, 15 J. HEALTH EcON. 555, 564 tbl.2 (1996).
202. See, e.g., id.; Philip J. Cook et al., The Effects of Short-Term Variation in Abortion Funding on
Pregnancy Outcomes, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 241(1999); Janet Currie et al., Restrictions on Medicaid Funding of
Abortion: Effects of Birth Weight and Pregnancy Resolutions, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 159, 185-86 (1996). But
see Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, The Effect of Abortion Restrictions on the Timing of Abortions, 20 J.
HEALTH ECON. 1011, 1027 (2001) ("The results for the fraction of the post-first trimester abortions do not
suggest that Medicaid restriction is a given state lead to changes in the timing of abortions in that state.... [o]ur
results for Medicaid restrictions may be surprising since several previous studies found that Medicaid funding
restrictions lower the overall abortion rate.").
203. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-31 to -35 (1993).
204. Theodore Joyce et al., The Impact of Mississippi's Mandatory Delay Law on Abortions and Births,
278 JAMA 653 (1997).
205. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 130.
206. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas Staiger, Teen Motherhood and Abortion Access, 111 Q.J. ECON. 467,
467-506 (1996) [hereinafter Kane & Staiger, Teen Motherhood].
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law like that at issue in Hodgson v. Minnesota2°7-tend to lower the teen birth
rate.
208
However, this "good news" about abortion restrictions-i.e, the drop in the
teen birth rate-is compromised because the restrictions do not seem to reduce
the teenage sex rate (a fact conservatives forget to mention when trumpeting this
restriction and abstinence only sex-education)09 because teens use contraception
rather than abstain from sexual activity.2 0 Teen in-wedlock births went down-
out-of-wedlock births were unaffected-when access to abortion providers was
restricted. 2' In any case, the implication of all these studies is "that increasing
abortion access increases the incidence of unprotected sex. 212
Conversely, two more recent studies found that these types of laws had no
significant effect on abortion or birth rates.23 This finding is consonant with the
findings of political scientists McFarlane and Meier whose research indicated
that none of the states' efforts in restricting abortion-e.g., mandatory waiting
periods and parental involvement law-worked in reducing abortion rates.
2' 1
They argue that these laws might simply delay women from having an abortion
rather than affecting her ultimate choice, which only serves to place her health at
greater risk by undergoing a later-term abortion.2" Building on Levine's research
(and Bitler's and Zavodny's), Jonathan Klick found that "waiting periods do
improve mental health among females as evidenced by a statistically and
practically significant drop in the suicide rate [of about ten percent] when states
adopt waiting periods."2 6 However, he also noted that "it appears as though
restricting Medicaid funding for abortions leads to an increase in female suicide
rates. 217
207. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). This was the Court's latest foray into the parental notification area; they
upheld the constitutionality of a Minnesota law that required both parents be notified before a minor obtained an
abortion, but also upheld a law that allowed for a judicial bypass procedure. Id.
208. Kane & Staiger, Teen Motherhood, supra note 206, at 467, 469, 503.
209. See Sharon Jayson, Sex Education Grants Chums Over Clash, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2007, at 5d
(noting that abstinence-only programs have been shown by a congressionally mandated study to have "zero"
effect on teen sex); Democrats to Cut Off Abstinence-Only Funds, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 12, 2007,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-ml058/is 12_124/ai_n19328667/pgjl (noting that Democrats expected
cuts "spark[ed] outrage among social conservative groups").
210. Philip B. Levine, Parental Involvement Laws and Fertility Behavior, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 861, 875
(2003).
211. Kane & Staiger, Teen Motherhood, supra note 206, at 467.
212. Klick, Econometric Analyses, supra note 189, at 763. This makes sense. A central thesis of
econometric studies of abortion is that abortion operates, in many important ways, like a form of insurance. Id.
at 755-56. Put differently, the legalization of abortion decreased the cost of unintended pregnancy (and
consequently, because of the lower cost, people engaged in more "risky" sex). LEVINE, SEX AND CONSE-
QUENCES, supra note 22, at 3.
213. Phillip Levine, Parental Involvement Law and Fertility Behavior, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 861, 873
(2003); Marianne Bitler and Madeline Zavodny, The Effect of Abortion Restrictions on the Timing of Abortions,
20 J. HEALTH ECON. 1011, 1026-27 (2001).
214. MCFARLANE&MEIER, FERTILITY CONTROL, supra note 157, at 126-28.
215. Id. at 128.
216. Klick, Mandatory Waiting Periods, supra note 22, at 185.
217. Id. at 207-08 (emphasis added).
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An important tangent to the increase in suicide rates is the claim, common in
the pro-life movement, that the scientific evidence shows that abortion results in
psychological and emotional harm to women. 2" David Reardon-a leader in the
pro-life movement who is also a medical doctor-and others point to studies that
ostensibly show emotional problems post-abortion.2 9 However, these studies
have been severely undercut by other researchers who note that they suffer from
220
severe methodological and analytical shortcomings. Moreover, there is a
significant body of research from reputable organizations and scholarly
journals-such as the American Psychological Association (APA) and the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)-which has repeatedly
rejected the notion that there are psychological ills that await women who obtain
an abortion.2 Researchers have concluded that "[t]here is no scientific basis for
constructing abortion as a severe physical or mental health threat," 222 nor do
• 221
women show increased psychiatric illness after undergoing an abortion.
F. Legalized Abortion Enhances Women's Chances to Succeed
Abortion legalization has decreased teen (1) marriage rates; (2) fertility; and
(3) single-mother births.224 It has increased schooling and employment rates for
black teens, which is connected to significant decreases in their fertility rates
(including out-of-wedlock fertility).225 White teens did not seem to experience
any increase in schooling and employment rates; connected with this, they
experienced slight decreases in birth and marriage rates.226 A careful study by
economists222 shows that both black and white women who bear children in their
218. See Siegel, New Politics, supra note 22, at 993 n.5 (collecting sources from organization like
Concerned Women for American and Focus on the Family).
219. See, e.g., David Reardon et al., Psychiatric Admissions of Low-Income Women Following Abortion
and Childbirth, 168 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1253 (2006); Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy, supra note
22.
220. Brenda Major, Psychological Implications of Abortions-Highly Charged and Rife with Misleading
Research 168 CANADIAN MED. ASs'N J. 1257, 1257-58 (2006); Klick, Mandatory Waiting Periods, supra note
22, at 187 (criticizing the Gissler study).
221. See, e.g., Nada L. Stotland, The Myth of the Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268 JAMA 2078, 2078
(1992); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994) (refusing to name as a disorder "postabortion syndrome")
222. Nancy F. Russo & Jean E. Denious, Controlling Birth: Science, Politics, and Public Policy, 61 J.
SOC. ISSUES 181, 185 (2005).
223. Anne C. Gilchrist et al., Termination of Pregnancy and Psychiatric Morbidity, 167 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 243,243-48 (1995).
224. Joshua Angrist & William N. Evans, Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of the 1970 State




227. Many of the previous studies, routinely cited by those on the left, have serious methodological
issues. See, e.g., Arline T. Geronimus & Sanders Korenman, The Socioeconomic Consequences of Teen
Childbearing Reconsidered, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1187, 1188 (1992) (arguing that previous studies of teen mothers
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teenage years have significantly higher rates of poverty, are more likely to be on
221
welfare, and are more likely to have lower incomes (exactly how much higher
of rate is subject to some dispute).229
Salting these decidedly positive findings is Akerlof's model,23° theorizing that
legalized abortion gives males increased power in the marriage and sex market
because females who do not engage in pre-marital sex are at a distinct
disadvantage to those who will.23 ' However, this has been through no
"substantive empirical testing that could validate" it,12 and, moreover, there are
other economic models that come to a contradictory conclusion (which of course
have not been subjected to their own crucible of empirical testing). 23
G. Legalized Abortion Protects Children Against Violence and Marginalization
Abortion legalization has resulted in a statistically significant reduction in
homicides of one to four year-olds, although researchers did not find a statis-
tically significant reduction in homicides of infants less than one year old.234 In
other research focusing on children, economists Marianne Bitler and Madeline
Zavodny found that while there was no clear negative relationship between child
abuse and common restrictions on abortion, legalized abortion led to lower
reported rates of "child maltreatment.
' 23 5
Jonathan Gruber, Phillip Levine, and Douglas Staiger, in a fascinating piece
of research utilizing econometric tools, find that children who would otherwise
have been born but were aborted-the "marginal child"-would have been
nearly fifty percent more likely to live below the poverty line, forty percent more
likely not to make it past infanthood, roughly sixty percent more likely to live in
single-parent home, and forty-five percent more likely to be on welfare.236
Concomitant with that, women who have an unplanned teenage pregnancy have
have failed to take into account relevant differences in these types of women vis-A-vis the female population).
228. Jeff Grogger & Stephen G. Bronars, The Socioeconomic Consequences of Teenage Childbearing:
Findings From a Natural Experiment, 25 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 156, 158-59 (1993).
229. V. Joseph Hotz et al., Teenage Childbearing and its Lifecycle Consequences: Exploiting a Natural
Experiment, 40 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 683 (2004) (arguing that previous studies have overstated the negative
consequences of subsequent life impacts on teenage mothers).
230. Forsythe & Presser, Tragic Failure, supra note 22.
231. Id. at 280.
232. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 161-64, 189-90.
233. Kane & Staiger, Teen Motherhood, supra note 206, at 467.
234. Susan B. Sorenson, Douglas J. Wiebe & Richard A. Berk, Legalized Abortion and the Homicide of
Young Children: An Empirical Investigation, 2 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 239, 250-53 (2002). It is
noteworthy that the researchers were "hard-pressed" to find any plausible alternative explanations, other than
legalized abortion, for the reduction. Id. at 252-53.
235. See Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, Child Abuse and Abortion Availability, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 363, 365-66 (2002). The common restrictions are restrictions on Medicaid funding, mandatory waiting
periods, and parental notification laws. Id. at 366.
236. Jonathan Gruber et al., Abortion Legalization and Child Living Circumstances: Who is the
"Marginal Child"?, 114 Q.J. EcON. 263,288-91 (1999).
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much higher rates of poverty, welfare dependency, and lower rates of income. 37
However, some caution should be used in drawing conclusions from these studies
because of causation vis- -vis correlation.238
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A fair reading of the empirical evidence shows that, while something of a
mixed bag, legalized abortion has been a positive for women. There are fewer
late-term abortions.239 Legalization has increased access for most women and
decreased medical costs. 24° In health terms, legalized abortion has led to safer
procedures and lessened negative side-effects, with the notable exception of
sexually transmitted diseases.24' Public welfare spending for abortions, moreover,
yields greater societal benefits than costs.2 42 Finally, greater reproductive choice
and control leaves women with more control over their future243 and protects
children from violence and marginalization 2 "
The issue here though is to figure out how the empirical evidence can do
work in the constitutional law context. I think that it's time to stipulate that
perhaps the substantive due process basis for the right to abortion has run its
course as the primary basis for the abortion right and should be subordinated to
the equal protection clause as the textual basis for the abortion.4 5 Some scholars,
however, are not ready to make that concession. They contend the distinction
between enumerated and unenumerated ights-the central issue with substantive
due process doctrine-is a false choice, positing instead that the "[lawyer's]
toolkit is so large that any right can be described as enumerated. 2 6 A favorite
thought experiment of those who espouse this viewpoint is the First Amendment:
the text of that amendment certainly does not protect flag burning24' or nude
dancing.24s How do we, the argument goes, get from speech to flag burning or
237. See, e.g., Grogger & Bronars, supra note 228, at 156.
238. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 175-76.
239. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
245. Although, I feel compelled to reiterate my earlier point that substantive due process could just as
easily be classified as the Privileges or Immunities Clause by a different name. See supra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text. I also sometimes wonder whether the substantive due process doctrine, as a whole, should
be abandoned given the internecine warfare that has been waxing and waning since Lochner, especially given
the rhetorical advantage it gives to those who oppose recognition of unenumerated rights. See FARBER,
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 92, at 2, 47, 73, 77, 82.
246. Tushnet, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 38, at 218 (using Frank Michelman's idea of "standard
legal methods" lawyers use to argue).
247. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
248. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); see also DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION,
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nude dancing, neither of which are obviously speech? To answer the question
satisfactorily "the discussion gets into considerations of free speech theory,
precedent, and the like-precisely what happens when the Court enforces what
its critics describe as an unenumerated right. 249
But this too easy. The free speech clause is self-sealing. Of course, political
(in addition to strategic, historical, and institutional) considerations will be taken
into account when a judge is evaluating whether the putative expression at issue
is protected-the Warren Court era draft card burning case is a good example.250
However, at a certain point, the First Amendment's text cannot be stretched any
further, at least not without making "off the wall" legal arguments. At a certain
point, the "expression" at issue can no longer rationally be called thus the
dichotomy between conduct versus expression in First Amendment juris-
prudence. Compare gay and lesbian rights, punitive damages, anti-comman-
deering legislation, contraception and abortion, family autonomy, euthanasia,
information control, right to travel, voting rights, right to marry, freedom of
association, and the right of parents to educate and rear their children. 22 Even an
amendment as broad as the First Amendment cannot cover the rights territory
that Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" does (or could, or will). 3 There is no
common legal thread (or principle) that can plausibly tie together all the
unenumerated rights cases.'5 While the First Amendment allows judges free rein
to make policy-based decisions within a pliable but bounded jurisprudential solar
system, substantive due process can be stretched to a constitutional Milky Way.255
supra note 90, at 130 (arguing that the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated rights is "simply
irrelevant").
249. Tushnet, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 38, at 216.
250. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
251. See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 87; see also Mark Tushnet, Self-
Historicism, supra note 37, at 773-75 (arguing that the historical era "a well-socialized lawyer" finds himself in
will determine what makes certain legal arguments plausible or not). In this same vein, this is one of the central
problems with Dworkin's First Amendment abortion argument; if the religion clauses can house the right to
abortion, then "religion" has ceased to exist as a meaningful word.
252. Id. at 211-15 (delineating unenumerated rights currently protected under the Constitution and
noting that this is a somewhat arbitrary way to list them).
253. For example, if not for the "Nixon Four" (and an otherwise general shift in the political will away
from liberalism) the Court could have added education and welfare to the list. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Although Dandridge is
technically an equal protection case.
254. One might respond that perhaps there's not supposed to be, but this again cedes the rhetorical high-
ground to conservatives. See also Tribe & Dorf, Levels of Generality, supra note 140, at 1061 (arguing that the
process of determining the contours of enumerated rights is no less subjective than determining whether there is
an unenumerated right).
255. Perhaps the whole debate is beside the point for entirely different reasons. First, one might respond,
the recognition of unenumerated rights was intended by the Framers of the Bill of Rights and Reconstruction
Amendments, so it does not matter what the scope of unenumerated rights are. See FARBER, RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE, supra note 92, at 39-44, 53-62. Second, fears that Supreme Court will, without some constraining
theory (say, originalism), begin to arbitrarily "find" new rights in the Constitution is an unlikely scenario. This
is because the Supreme Court, as political scientists have been telling us for decades, rarely strays far from
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As currently conceived, substantive due process, to borrow Akhil Reed Amar's
phrase, allows scholars to belong to the "these are a few of my favorite rights"
school of constitutional theory.256
With these inherent problems-and without a revival of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause 57 (or much more fancifully,
Justice Douglas's holistic approach in Griswold)-reliance on substantive due
process should be subordinated to the equality principle(s) of the Fourteenth
Amendment.25s
Utilizing the Equal Protection Clause, buttressed by the empirical evidence,
is the most persuasive justification for the abortion right. In Jack Balkin's latest
paper, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, he argues that we need
to take the Constitution's text and history seriously to ensure that our "common
[constitutional] project" stays strong.9 This means divining the "underlying
principles" that the Constitution's text will bear. ° In the case of abortion, Balkin
argues that those principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment include
"prohibiting caste legislation, subordinating legislation, and arbitrary and unjust
discrimination. 26' I agree with this assessment. But I hasten to add that if we are
going to inform the underlying principles in the most intellectually satisfying
way, positive scholarship on abortion must have a more prominent role.
A compelling example is the difficult question of how to deal with the rights
of the fetus. The typical response from pro-choice scholars has been to pit the
female and a fetus in a moral personhood cage match and declare the woman the
winner, or declare that at a certain point the state's interest in fetal life trumps
the women's right to abortion (which undoubtedly should be the case). 263 But
majoritarian legislative preferences. Robert Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
National Policymaker, 6 J. PUB. LAW. 279, 285 (1957) ("The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the
United States."); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. So. REV. 795
(1975) (only "during transitional periods, in which the Court is holdover from the old coalition [due to
transitional elections]" will the countermajoritarian difficulty rear its head); see also Balkin & Levinson, supra
note 11, at 1064-70.
256. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 65, at 297.
257. See FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 92, at 197-200 (discussing the Ninth
Amendment).
258. See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, for a good discussion of why the Equal
Protection Clause is the most cogent textual basis for the abortion right.
259. Id. at 62.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 61 (citing to Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 4).
262. See, e.g., TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 89, at 1352, 1354-55 ("Even if we
view pre-viable fetuses as full human beings, the intimate and personal sacrifice that a ban on abortion would
impose on requiring a pregnant woman to nurture unborn life is one that our legal system almost never
demands"); Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 91, at 32 (stating that his argument "is entirely comfortable with the
claim that the destruction of the fetus is at least a morally problematic act. But it asserts that under current
conditions, the government cannot impose on women alone the obligation to protect fetuses through an a legal
act of bodily cooptation").
263. See, e.g., Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 99.
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neither approach answers the objections of those like Michael Paulsen, who
believe that abortion at any stage is akin to murder."
Essentially, conservatives contend that pro-choice accounts give short shrift
to the value of the fetal life. There is something to this argument, but it is
ultimately a weak one when viewed through the lens of the empirical evidence.
As a preliminary matter, it is certainly a valid concern that legalized abortion
might lead to a more callous societal attitude toward life, and that abortion-
particularly late-term abortions-brushes up close to infanticide, something no
one, save for Peter Singer and a few others,265 is comfortable with.2
However, putting to one side the infinitesimal number of these types of
abortions, the fetal life argument becomes most unconvincing when pro-lifers
like Michael Paulsen argue that the Supreme Court, through its abortion
jurisprudence, "affirms and embraces human genocide in the United States of a
dimension exceeding, in the decade that has just past, that of the Rwandan
genocide, the Nazi Holocaust, Stalin's purges, and Pol Pot's killing fields,
combined. 2 67 This argument epitomizes the overheated rhetoric that infects
abortion scholarship. Paulsen neglects the fact that if there was no legalized
abortion, abortion would simply be driven back into the black and gray markets268
that existed pre-Roe; estimates are imperfect but our most reliable ones indicate
that during the 1950s and 1960s, women obtained as many as one million
abortions per year. 69 There is no reason to doubt that this practice, in
264. See Paulsen, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 3, at 196-213.
265. See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 169-74 (2d ed. 1993); see also Michael Tooley, In Defense
ofAbortion and Infanticide, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION (Joel Feinberg ed., 1984).
266. It is worth noting that this is a cultural reaction rather than some universal moral value. For
example, neither the Greeks nor the Romans found infanticide morally problematic. See POSNER, SEX AND
REASON, supra note 17, at 272-73.
267. Paulsen, Worst Constitutional Decision, supra note 14, at 995-96.
268. See POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 277, 286; GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION,
supra note 17, at 40-47 (discussing how from 1900-1970 affluent white women were able to obtain safe
abortions on the gray market with the help of sympathetic doctors and a conscious decision by law enforcement
agents not to interfere with the practice).
269. See Susan A. Cohen, Envisioning Life Without Roe: Lessons Without Borders, GUTTMACHER REP.
ON PUB. POL'Y, May 2003, at 3, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/06/2/grO60203.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (in the 1950s and 1960s "some 700,000 to 800,000 abortions were estimated to have
taken place annually"). See also LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REVOLUTION 22 (1973);
POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 206 (citing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 180 tbl.6.1 (1991)) (estimating "that 70 percent of abortions today
would be performed anyway if abortion were illegal"); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 353-55 (1991) (aggregating studies and determining that one million
abortions per year is the most reasonable estimate); James R. Abernathy et al., Estimates ofInduced Abortion in
Urban North Carolina, 7 DEMOGRAPHY 19, 26 (1970) (using statistical analysis to reach estimate of 700,000
and 829,000 abortions per year in the United States). Christopher Tietze & Clyde E. Martin, Fetal Deaths,
Spontaneous and Induced, in the Urban White Population of the United States, 11 POPULATION STUD. 170, 175
(1957) (arguing that 20-25% of pregnancies were aborted). For a rejection of the pro-life attempt to dispute
these numbers, see GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 23.
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substantially the same amount, would still go on were abortion recriminalized.27 °
Setting aside the fact that legalized abortion has allowed women a chance to
safely terminate pregnancies which, in many cases, would have been terminated
in unsafe conditions (especially for women from low socio-economic
backgrounds),27' it is hard to take seriously the comparison of forty-three percent
of all American women 72-the percentage, remember, who will have at least one
abortion-to genocidal maniacs and sadistic dictators. The fetal life argument
simply does not deal in the reality of how society operates when abortion is
illegal. This argument-whether abortion is murder-is, or should be, a non-
starter in a legal discussion of the constitutional right to abortion; the government
cannot plausibly advance protection of fetal life as an important and legitimate
state interest when the recriminalization of abortion would do little to actually
curb the practice. It could only be accepted if we knew that abortion laws would
be vigorously enforced. However, this was not case pre-Roe (and therefore
cannot be expected to be the case if abortion was again outlawed). Given that
public opinion does not favor outlawing abortion, this is not a large logical leap;
it is difficult to imagine that upper-middle class Americans would countenance
criminal prosecution-or some significant regulation--of their daughters'
reproductive choices. 273 Along the same lines, we know that abortion is
disproportionately favored by the American elite, the same people responsible for
enforcement (or lack thereof) of the abortion laws.274 The moral personhood of
the fetus should be left instead to the field of moral philosophy (and of course
275
scientific advances).
The empirical evidence, besides offering a way out of the fetal life dilemma,
powerfully undercuts the current rhetorical approach of the pro-life movement--
abortion harms women-instead showing that abortion has benefited women and
helped equalize their role in society. First, as previously discussed, the notion
that woman are harmed psychologically by abortion is not supported by the
empirical evidence.276 What is more, now that misperception has the imprimatur
of the Supreme Court.277
270. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 41-47.
271. id.
272. Henshaw, supra note 174.
273. See Gallup Poll, supra note 146.
274. See GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 17, at 146-47.
275. Moral philosophers are nowhere near agreement on the fetal personhood issue. See generally THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY: 25 YEARS AFTER ROE V. WADE (Louis P. Pojman & Francis J. Beckwith eds., 2d ed.
1998) (collecting, among other writings, essays by moral philosophers which collecting essays by moral
philosophers who argue about fetal personhood and its moral implications).
276. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. It is also an eerily fascinating contention because it
mirrors in important ways the argument made during the postbellum campaign to criminalize abortion that
women needed to be prevented from having abortion because it was harmful to them. See Siegel, Reasoning
From the Body, supra note 101, at 293-94.
277. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). Perhaps most troubling is that Justice Ginsburg
included, in a footnote, some of the studies cited above (and others) that undercut what Justice Kennedy deemed
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Second, the empirical evidence shows that, on balance, abortion has given
women an equal chance at the full and unfettered participation in all facets of
life. Conversely, foreclosing the abortion option for teenage mothers may foist
upon them poverty and welfare dependence; access to abortion can give these
women a chance to perhaps avoid that fate. We have also seen that legalized
abortion reduces the number of late-term abortions which pose a greater threat to
women's health. Finally, proscribing abortion would mean that women who
obtain multiple abortions would be forced to endure raising a child in a
physically or sexually abusive relationship.27 s All of these examples empirically
support the argument that abortion bans (or substantial early-pregnancy
regulation) run afoul of the underlying principles of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"prohibiting caste legislation, subordinating legislation, and arbitrary and unjust
discrimination. 279
Reva Siegel's scholarship serves as a good tool to make the point more
explicit. In her Stanford Law Review article from 1992, Siegel argues for an
equal protection approach to the abortion right.20 After an expert synthesis of the
history of the postbellum movement by the medical profession to encourage
legislatures to criminalize abortion, Siegel provides a very useful discussion of
how current equal protection precedent and doctrine could quite easily be applied
to the abortion context.28 However, the final section of her article-coming under
the heading "The Antisubordination Inquiry"-attempts to cement her point by
arguing that an equal protection analysis needs to focus not only on the state
actors' "judgment and justifications" but on how abortion affects women's
lives.282 Up until this point, Siegel's argument is persuasive. However, she
invokes mostly feminist theory to talk about the effects of abortion regulation on
women, including advocating that women be compensated by the state for
bearing and raising children.283 This is where her argument loses steam. I agree
an "unexceptionable" proposition. Id. at 1649 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Interestingly, this is not the first
time Kennedy has been criticized for his utilization of the empirical evidence. In the juvenile death penalty case,
Kennedy asserted that "as any parent knows," juveniles lack the emotional or moral maturity to be held to
account the same as adults. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005). In fact, the empirical literature
showed "that there is no inflection point at age 18 at which murderers suddenly discover the moral significance
of their acts." Richard Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1713 (2006); see
also Richard Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 64-65 (2005) (noting that the
empirical evidence did not "support a categorical exclusion of sixteen-and seventeen-year-olds from the ranks
of the mature. At most, the studies demonstrate a need for careful inquiry into the maturity of a young person
charged with capital murder."). Jeffrey Rosen recently wrote an article about Justice Kennedy arguing that he
has didactic tendencies toward moral certitudes. See Rosen, Supreme Leader, NEW REPUBLIC, at 20-27. One
might query whether Justice Kennedy's Gonzales opinion was example of the tendencies delineated in Rosen's
article.
278. See infra note 282.
279. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 61.
280. See Siegel, Reasoning From the Body, supra note 101.
281. Id. at 347-63.
282. Id. at 368-69.
283. Id. at 377.
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that the judicial inquiry should also (perhaps primarily) be on the effects of
abortion regulation on women. But abortion regulations or prohibition
subordinate and discriminate against women in numerous empirically verifiable
ways-e.g., forcing them into the choice of bearing a child against their will or
having an abortion in unsafe or unsanitary conditions (especially for low-income
women), increasing the number of late-term abortions which pose a greater risk
to women, and forcing them to raise a child in an abusive relationship--that we
can show without resorting to the contested normative arguments.
Finally, the objections to the equal protection argument noted above are not
substantial. As noted above, that some economic models show that abortion hurts
some woman in the marriage market is small beer; there is no empirical evidence
to support those models 284 (obviating Judge Posner's point).285 However, even if
we stipulate that abortion hurts as well as helps some women, this is not enough
to deprive women of the right to abortion. Simply because Booker T.
Washington, in his famous "Atlanta Compromise" speech of 1895, contended
that the Jim Crow apparatus was tolerable 286 did not mean that it was
constitutionally acceptable. Parallel to that, simply because some women are
ostensibly opposed to abortion-although it should not be forgotten that pro-life
women abort the same rate as all other women 27-this cannot mean their putative
preferences control the constitutionality of abortion restrictions 288
In sum, it is more difficult to dismiss arguments based on empirical evidence
(combined with the already substantial body of normative and doctrinal work),
than arguments grounded only in normative constitutional theory. It is more
persuasive to be able to point toward the real gains available to women in no
small part due to legalized abortion (and the real burdens should it be
overregulated or outlawed) rather than waxing philosophical about what
"equality" means. To give one more example: when discussing the constitu-
tionality of Medicaid funding restrictions on abortion, rather than penning
another paean to equality and the penalty for poverty, scholars should discuss the
284. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
285. See POSNER, SEX AND REASON, supra note 17, at 341.
286. See Booker T. Washington, The 1895 Atlanta Compromise Speech, http://historymatters.gmu.
edu/d/39/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that "[iln all things that are purely social we can be
as separate as the fingers..." and "[t]he wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of
social equality is the extremist folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us
must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing"). It is eerie how in many
respects Justice Thomas seems to have taken over Washington's mantle. See KEVIN MERIDA AND MICHAEL A.
FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLARENCE THOMAS, 232, 257, 266-67, 302 (2007)
(recounting, for example, the putative paradox that most who "love Thomas are white" and his many times
cantankerous relationship with the black civil rights establishment); see also Calvin TerBeek, Write Separately:
Justice Clarence Thomas's "Race" Opinions on the Supreme Court, II TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 185,204-09 (2006)
(discussing Thomas's aversion to affirmative action).
287. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
288. The Court has sufficient doctrine to work with in order to make a smooth transition, should it so
choose, to an equal protection basis for abortion. See Siegel, Reasoning From the Body, supra note 101, at 264,
349, 355-56.
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truly disturbing fact that these restrictions lead to an increase in suicides among
low-income women.289 This is concrete evidence that this restriction may very
well run afoul of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
This article only scratches the surface of the wealth of positive scholarship
on abortion that can be used to further strengthen the constitutionalization of the
abortion right.290 The underutilization of empirical evidence in the debate is to our
detriment. Constitutional scholarship is, to my mind, most useful insofar as it
acknowledges its real world consequences. The debate can best be furthered by
focusing on the "known facts," rather than normative constitutional theorizing
that only preaches to the pro-choice professorial choir. Grounding the right to
abortion in the Equal Protection Clause gives the right its strongest textual
foundation, and utilizing the empirical evidence to buttress the right gives it the
strongest possible constitutional foundation.
289. See Klick, Mandatory Waiting Periods, supra note 22, at 207-08. The author theorizes that "[i]t
would seem that funding restrictions lower the access one has to abortion services, leading women to bear the
burdens of childbirth and child rearing for which they may not be ready. This apparently leads to increases in
stress levels and eventually a rising suicide rate." Id.
290. Sanford Levinson has argued that perhaps Roe should be abandoned because its opponents are not
going to give up and the ensuing political fight is an electoral boon to the GOP. See Debate Club, Should
Liberals Stop Defending Roe?, supra note 145. This argument has some appeal at first blush but, to take just
one of Balkin's counterpoints, if Roe falls, this places the rest of sexual-autonomy line of cases--Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Lawrence-in a politically and doctrinally perilous position. Id.
